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Obstacles to Increasing Tax Revenues in Low Income Countries 
 
Mick Moore 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper is focused on the question: why do the governments of low income countries not 
raise more tax revenues? Two different but complementary approaches are used to answer 
it. The first approach is comparisons: among countries today, and within countries over time. 
This approach tends to generate relatively conservative answers to the central question. It 
leads to an emphasis on the ‘sticky’ nature of the taxation. For any individual country in 
‘normal times’ – i.e. excluding situations of war, major internal conflict, the collapse or rapid 
reconstruction of state power - revenue collections, measured as a proportion of GDP, do not 
change much from year to year. This is partly because effective taxation systems require a 
great deal of coordination and cooperation between revenue agencies and other 
organisations, both inside and outside the public sector. It is hard quickly to improve the 
effectiveness of a complex organisational network. The ‘stickiness’ of tax collections also 
reflects the fact that the overall tax take – i.e. the proportion of GDP raised as public revenue 
– is to a significant degree determined by the structure of national economies. For logistical 
reasons, it is much easier to raise revenue from economies (a) that are high income, urban 
and non-agricultural and (b) where the ratio of international trade to GDP is high. The 
government of the average low income country raises less than 20 per cent of GDP in 
revenue. It makes no sense for such governments to aim to match OECD tax takes of 30-45 
per cent of GDP. 
 
The comparative and historical approach also draws attention to the political constraints on 
the capacity of governments to raise more revenues. These political constraints are quite 
variable across time and space. The most familiar is the capacity of wealthy people and 
companies to influence opaque processes of tax policy formulation and administration to 
ensure that they pay less in taxes than most other people would consider reasonable. But this 
kind of interest group politics is only one of the sets of political phenomena we need to take 
into account. Another is that the organisations that collect taxes often engage in a 
considerable amount of rent-taking. They make money illegally for their own staff, often 
handing over some of it to their political masters. In the process of making money illegally, 
they often cut deals with taxpayers, to the double detriment of the public treasury. These 
practices tend to bring tax collection into disrepute, and decrease overall willingness to pay. 
The tax system also serves another political purpose. The ability of governments to grant tax 
exemptions – i.e. to exclude specific companies, industries or individuals from tax entirely, 
typically on the grounds that this is an ‘incentive’ to bring in more investment – is in some 
countries a significant instrument through which governments command support and political 
financing. The tax losses are enormous. Finally, the design of a country’s political and 
government institutions can sometimes have a significant effect on its capacity to tax. In 
particular, if the authority to raise taxes is institutionally and politically very separate from the 
authority to spend public money, the political capacity to raise revenues is likely to be 
reduced.  
 
The second approach to answering the central question of this paper is to examine the 
potential benefits of reforms in tax policy and administration. This generates more optimism 
about the possibilities of raising additional revenues. The paper deals in particular with three 
reform issues. The first is the scope for the governments of low income countries to obtain 
more revenue by better taxing transnational economic transactions, above all those involving 
large transnational companies. The picture here is very unclear, not least because attitudes, 
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understanding and policies are changing quite rapidly at the global level. Low income 
countries might benefit from a wide range of reforms now on global policy agendas. But they 
would be unwise to rely heavily on such an outcome. The second issue concerns the scope to 
adopt more widely a bundle of what I term ‘advanced tax administration practices’. Although 
they originate mainly in OECD countries, these ‘advanced tax administration practices’ have 
already had a significant impact in many low income countries, and are not intrinsically 
inappropriate to their circumstances. But in one respect they do not address the needs of low 
income countries: they do not tackle the problem of the gross under-taxation of land and 
property. This is the third policy reform area. The case for substantial taxes on land and 
property is compelling. The obstacles are both political and institutional.   
 
If we look for specific ‘revenue gaps’ in low income countries, the most evident are: the large 
amounts of potential tax that are given away routinely by governments in the form of 
unjustified ‘tax incentives’; the under-taxation of land and property; evasion by those 
transnational corporations that use transfer mispricing to relocate their profits to the places in 
the world where they pay little or no tax; the under-taxation of the profits of mining companies 
(at least when we take into account the prices for minerals over the past decade); and the 
under-taxation of the wealth and incomes of very rich individuals. But the more visible revenue 
gaps are not always the most important. The productivity of VAT in some countries is low 
because the system is poorly designed. The easiest way to raise more revenue might be to 
make a series of apparently highly technical changes to the VAT. And even the visible 
revenue gaps might not always be best tackled frontally. There will be moments when that 
seems right. But a frontal assault is not always the best way to win a tax war. Effective tax 
reform typically requires large doses of political cunning, and may best be wrapped in the 
soothing – or even soporific – language of ‘tax administration improvements’. If employed 
intelligently, the obscure concept of ‘broadening the tax base’ could be used in many 
countries significantly to narrow the five big ‘revenue gaps’ listed above. Tax is simultaneously 
both a highly political and a highly technical issue. It is not useful to make advance 
judgements about how technical knowledge and politics might best be combined to raise more 
revenue in any specific context.  
 
Keywords: tax, tax administration, revenue, low income countries, politics, rent-taking 
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Table 1 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics on sources of government revenue, by country category 
Country category: Low income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Upper-middle 
income 
High income 
non-OECD* 
High income 
OECD 
Number of countries: (37) (48) (41) (18) (30) 
a. Government revenue as a % of GDP 18 26 29 34 42 
b. Government revenue, excluding grants, as a % 
of GDP 
15 26 28 34 41 
c. Government taxes as a % of GDP (i.e. excludes 
non-tax revenue) 
13 18 21 16 35 
d. Taxes as a % of total government revenue  71 67 73 46 85 
d. Income taxes as a % of GDP 4 5 5 6 13 
e. Corporate income taxes as a % of GDP 2 3 3 2 3 
f. Personal income taxes as a % of GDP 2 2 2 3 10 
g. International trade taxes as a % of GDP 4 5 5 3 1 
h. Taxes on goods and services, including VAT, as 
a % of GDP 
5 6 7 5 11 
i. Corporate income taxes (CIT) as a % of 
government revenue 
12 11 12 7 7 
j. Personal income taxes (PIT) as a % of 
government revenue 
9 7 8 8 23 
k. Ratio of CIT to PIT revenue  1.4 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.3 
 
Source: IMF (2011, appendix table 2).  
 
Note: The numbers show the means within each category and relate to recent years. 
 
* These are mainly countries with high levels of income from energy or mineral extraction. 
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Introduction 
 
Approach 
 
This paper is focused on the question: why do the governments of low income countries not 
raise more tax revenues? There is a wide range of potential answers to this question. Some 
are purely speculative. Others are based on solid evidence. And many lie somewhere in-
between. In sorting out what we reliably know from a wide range of propositions about what 
might be significant, I have used two different but complementary approaches. 
 
Comparison: realism 
 
The first approach, that is most evident in the early sections of the paper, is comparison, both 
among countries today, and within countries over time. This reflects my awareness both of 
the very political character of taxation and, more specifically, the ‘sticky’ nature of the tax 
collection business: in normal circumstances – i.e. excluding episodes of very rapid 
economic growth, war, major conflict, or the collapse of political authority – the total revenues 
collected by governments vary little from year to year.1 If you know how much revenue a 
government collected in 2013 then, making allowance for inflation, you can reliably predict 
how much it will collect in 2014. This stability is partly because, especially in low income 
countries, the behaviour of tax agencies is governed by the annual incremental collection 
targets set by ministries of finance. But it also reflects a more structural factor. Revenue 
agencies are highly ‘networked’ organisations, dependent on active cooperation from a wide 
range of other stakeholders, including ministries of finance, commerce and justice; 
authorities responsible for registering motor vehicles, businesses and property; public 
utilities; public procurement agencies; the police, judiciary and public prosecutor; border 
security forces; tax agencies in other countries; banks; employers; large companies; 
insurance companies; company registrars; business associations; and professional 
associations of accountants and auditors (Bird and Zolt 2008; Vázquez-Caro and Bird 
2010).2 New tax policies and administrative improvements within a revenue agency may 
have very limited impact if not supported by corresponding changes in the network. Waves of 
enthusiasm for reforming tax policy and administration in one direction or another tend to 
leave few detectable footprints in the historical tax statistics.3 Tax policy reforms and 
changes in prevalent ideologies about how tax should be practised are generally more 
abundant than substantial changes in tax performance. 
 
It follows that we should be sceptical of claims that any specific tax innovation could lead to 
major increases in revenue collection in low income countries in the short term, i.e. within 
periods measured in years rather than in decades. Indeed, at present there seems to be very 
little realistic prospect of any major change in tax regimes comparable in magnitude, for 
example, to the introduction of VAT in low income countries over the past three decades.4 The 
                                                 
1  Incidents of more or less total state failure – i.e. collapses in the effective authority of government – were responsible, 
for example, for big falls in revenue collection in Bolivia, Ghana, Peru and Uganda in the 1980s, and in Rwanda in the 
early 1990s. Conversely, unusually large and sustained increases in the ratio of revenue collections to GDP were 
achieved in Brazil under President Cardoso (1995-2003). 
2  For an illustrative table of the extent to which Latin American tax administrations use some of the main third party 
sources of information on actual or potential taxpayers, see Corbacho et al. (2013: Table 6.2).  
3  Bird (2012); Keen (2012); Vázquez-Caro and Bird (2010). 
4  Overall, it took more than half a century for VAT to spread from France in the mid-1950s to cover most of the world 
today. The experience of introducing VAT has been broadly positive. There is a large literature on VAT, and much 
criticism of the fact that it has been actively promoted in developing countries by the IMF in particular. The major 
criticism is that VAT is regressive because it is a tax on consumption. There is no space here to evaluate all the 
arguments for or against VAT. It is potentially a very effective means of increasing tax revenues, and has generally been 
used in this way in low income countries. The introduction of VAT has been a useful stimulus to broader tax 
administration forms in many low income countries. And the alleged regressive impact is not actually evident in the 
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‘flat tax’ was briefly fashionable about two decades ago, and was introduced in a few 
European ex-Communist countries, but it is clear that it is in no sense a ‘silver bullet’. A 
number of Latin American countries continue to experiment with bank transaction taxes. While 
they raise a little revenue, their effectiveness declines over time as they encourage 
businesses and people to find ways of by-passing banks (Corbacho et al. 2013: chapter 12). 
The area of greatest current uncertainty is in the taxation of international economic 
transactions. It is almost certain that the governments of many low income countries are 
deprived of large sums of legitimate revenue as a result of the legal and accounting fictions – 
and occasional outright frauds – practised by mining companies and other transnational 
companies (Section 6). Formally, and notably through recent statements from the G20, the 
G8, the OECD and other international actors, this has become a priority area for international 
attention. But substantial reductions in transnational tax avoidance require sustained 
collective action by the governments of many countries, especially those of the OECD, and 
the large emerging middle and low income countries (broadly, the BRICS). Regardless of their 
public espousal of such cooperation, almost all governments pursue individualistic policies 
designed to maximise their national share of investment and tax revenue. In general, the 
countries whose cooperation is most needed to make international collective action effective 
are those best placed to maximise their individual shares of investment and tax revenue by 
pursuing competitive policies. There is very little global governance in the public revenue field. 
There is no revenue equivalent to the World Trade Organisation, which has mitigated similar 
problems in respect of trade by creating an authoritative forum in which a large number of 
competing national interests can be reconciled through long negotiation.5  
 
There are also grounds to suspect that the benefits of wider international cooperation in taxing 
transnational economic transactions might accrue more to larger BRICS-type countries than to 
more typical low income countries. The governments and tax authorities of the larger 
economies – including for example Indonesia and South Africa as well as Brazil, Russia, India 
and China – have more bargaining power in relation to inward transnational investors. This 
has been evident recently in the extent to which the Brazilian, Chinese and Indian tax 
authorities have become assertive in their interpretations of (complex) principles, rules and 
laws around transfer pricing, i.e. the accounting prices used for non-market international 
transactions between related companies (UNDESA 2013: chapter 10).6 Partly because they 
are larger and can call on a wider range of specialist staff, the tax authorities of the BRICS 
and similar countries tend to be more competent. They are better placed than the tax 
authorities of the more typical low income country to benefit reforms proposed by the G8/G20, 
including proposals to make the exchange of information among national tax authorities much 
easier. While recognising that the prospects for significant reform of the international tax 
regime are better now than they have been for a long time, we should be sceptical about the 
extent to which formal commitments will result in effective action, and about the likelihood that 
smaller low income countries in particular will reap major benefits.7 
 
                                                 
(poor) available figures. See Bird and Gendron (2007); Ebrill et. al. (2001,  2002); Gemmell and Morrissey (2005); Keen 
(2007); and Keen and Lockwood (2010).   
5  The OECD is the only international organisation directly representing governments that has a substantial revenue 
competence and remit. It has been accorded a central role in designing the policies and programmes needed to 
operationalise the formal commitments being made by the G8 and the G20 in respect of revenue issues. While it has 
attempted to be more inclusive in its discussions of international tax issues, the OECD only represents 34 high income 
economies. 
6  The accepted principle is that the transfer prices used for taxation purposes should be the prices that would pertain had 
there been an ‘arms length’ market transaction. This leaves considerable scope in practice for companies to choose the 
prices at which they book transnational transactions – and thus to choose where in the world they wish their profits to 
appear for taxation purposes. It is widely believed that transfer mispricing is the single most important mechanism for 
transferring profits from low income countries. For more information on transfer pricing and mispricing, see various 
chapters in Christian Aid (2010); European Commission (2011); Ernst and Young (2013); and Reuter (2012). 
7  They could possibly be losers. If the tax administrations of the OECD and BRICS-type countries develop better tools to 
identify and deter practices like transfer mispricing, transnational corporations could focus more of their tax avoidance 
efforts on low income countries with relatively weak tax administrations. 
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The scope for reform: optimism 
 
Comparisons, history and realism about the politics of taxation encourage us to be sceptical 
about the prospects for radical changes in the ways in which governments of low income 
countries collect taxes, or radical increases in their capacity to increase revenues. But that 
does not amount to pessimism about the scope to do better on both counts. My second 
approach to answering the central question in this paper is to examine, mainly in Sections 6 
to 8, the potential benefits of reforms in tax policy and administration. There is considerable 
scope for: better taxing transnational economic transactions (Section 6); extending the 
adoption of a bundle of what I term ‘advanced tax administration practices’ (Section 7); and 
taxing property (Section 8). 
 
The tax take: the broad picture 
 
What proportion of GDP do governments appropriate through taxation? Colloquially and in 
this paper that figure is called the tax take. Excluding aid and other non-tax revenue, that 
figure varies from an average of 13 per cent for low income countries and 35 per cent  for 
high income OECD countries (Table 1, row c.). Statistics on the tax take are widely used, 
especially to compare countries, and often with the implication that the size of the tax take is 
a useful way to evaluate the revenue collecting performance of governments. However, we 
need to exercise caution in drawing conclusions from these numbers: 
 
 First, and especially for low income countries, measures of the tax take may not be 
very reliable. The revenue collection figures themselves often vary by source, and are 
not as accurate or standardised as one might expect for what appears to be a strategic 
economic statistic.8 Estimations of the size of GDP are also contentious and unstable 
(Jerven 2013). For example, a recent re-estimation of the size of Ghana's GDP 
produced a large apparent decline in the national tax take.9  
 Second, as is explained in Section 1, tax takes for individual countries are to a 
significant degree given by the structures of their economies, especially per capita 
income levels. Tax take figures alone, unadjusted for features of economic structure, 
are not valid as measures of tax collection effort or performance. 
 Third, it is important to be aware of the distinction that appears almost universally in 
public accounts between governments’ tax revenues and their non-tax revenues. Most 
non-tax revenues – like user fees, royalties from exploitation of natural or other 
resources, income from state-owned enterprises, and seigniorage from the printing of 
currency – derive from government’s control over tangible assets. For accountants and 
economists, the biggest contemporary problem in distinguishing tax from non-tax 
revenue relates to compulsory social security contributions, paid by formal sector 
employees and/or their employers. Should they be defined and accounted as tax or 
non-tax revenues?10 They typically comprise elements of both. For the purposes of this 
chapter, the fuzziness of the conceptual, legal and accounting boundaries between tax 
and non-tax revenues is of little significance.11 I define taxation politically as the 
institutionalised, coercive transfer of income to rulers from the ruled. Much non-tax 
revenue falls into this category. My concern is with government revenue generally, 
                                                 
8  The IMF is the main source for such data. They have recently made some improvements in their series (Seiferling 
2013). The International Centre for Tax and Development is in the process of producing a more comprehensive and 
more thoroughly sanitised data set on government revenue in low income countries than those sets currently available. 
9  This phenomenon is not restricted to low income countries. For example, the revised US national income statistics 
published in July 2013 were also significantly different from the earlier series, and implied a (small) change in the level 
of the tax take. 
10  The problem is that in many countries social security spending is in principle financed only from contributions (from 
employers, employees etc.) and nominally ring-fenced from general government fiscal activities, while in practice they 
are partially or completely integrated. 
11  Non-tax revenues are relatively more important for sub-national governments. 
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excluding aid. But those unfamiliar with revenue issues should be aware of the 
dangers of conflating figures on total government revenue with figures on tax 
revenue.12 
 
All that said, there are good practical reasons why most low income countries should aim to 
increase their tax takes by a few percentage points of GDP. These reasons have been 
articulated in a recent policy paper from the IMF (2011). They hinge on the potential 
collective benefits of greater public spending on social welfare and economic infrastructure. 
This paper starts from the assumption that the governments of most low income countries 
should increase the tax take. This may not be true in every case. Some governments may 
have as much revenue as they can productively spend, and others might do less damage if 
they had less money at their disposal. But in the most representative cases, higher tax 
revenues, better and more fairly collected, are desirable.  
 
The central role of bargaining 
 
Why do the governments of low income countries not raise more money in tax revenue? At 
the most abstract level, there is an obvious answer: taxation is the process of extracting 
money from people and organisations with no promise of any specific reciprocity. Resistance 
to this extraction is normal, natural, and desirable. A world in which governments could rely 
on taxpayers to meet unlimited revenue demands would be poverty stricken and ill-governed 
to an unimaginable degree. Resistance to attempts to extract taxes forces governments to 
explain their case for revenue, and to engage in bargaining of various kinds with taxpayers. It 
has played a significant role in the development of efficient, accountable governance.13 
 
The collection of taxes depends ultimately on the willingness and ability of governments to use 
force. Conversely, force alone is not enough, and may be counterproductive. The efficiency 
and overall effectiveness of modern tax systems depends heavily on the extent of quasi-
voluntary compliance, i.e. the degree to which taxpayers will cooperate with tax authorities 
and pay what is due without engaging in high levels of resistance or delay. We might also 
term this ‘grudging compliance’ (Tilly 2005).  
 
It is not very helpful, either analytically or from a policy perspective, to approach the problem 
of low tax revenues by complaining that taxpayers are failing to meet their legal obligations, or 
to take the view that the art of successful tax collection is based solely or primarily on finding 
ways of enforcing those obligations. Effective enforcement is essential to efficient revenue 
collection. Most of us will comply only if we know that, in the last resort, we can be coerced. 
There are altruistic people who pay their taxes more willingly because they believe it is the 
right thing to do. Their numbers would however implode if they believed that many fellow 
citizens were not paying their share and getting away unpunished.14 Law and obligation are 
essential tools that make the revenue collection machine operate. But the machine itself is 
constructed through politics and bargaining. Processes of bargaining and exchange are 
central to the macro-level decisions about the design of tax regimes – the types of taxes 
levied, the rates applied, the legal definitions of the concepts used, the accounting practices 
accepted, the assessment and collection procedures followed – and to the more micro-level 
operational decisions about which taxpayers will be pursued by the tax authorities, how, and 
how far. Appreciating the role of these bargaining processes is essential to any reform 
project.15  
                                                 
12  Further, some official data on total government revenues covers both central and sub-national government, while some 
relates only to central government.  
13  Bates and Lien (1985); Gervasoni (2010); Moore (2008a, 2008b, forthcoming); Prichard (2009); and Tilly (1992). 
14  Survey evidence conforms to expectations. People are less willing to pay tax if they think other people are evading 
(Torgler 2005). 
15  Some social scientists (e.g. Zolberg 1980) use the term ‘strategic interaction’ for what I have called ‘bargaining’. For a 
broader discussion of bargaining, see Moore (2008a).  
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Tax regimes are bargained in the sense that they are either: (a) designed in formal or informal 
collaboration with the potential taxpayers (including those with the capacity to avoid becoming 
taxpayers); or (b) continuously reshaped as a result of either political pressures from 
taxpayers or the perceptions of tax authorities about how taxpayers have or will respond to 
changes in the regime.16  
 
Similar processes of bargaining and exchange occur continuously at the level of 
implementation – assessment, collection, auditing, dispute resolution, etc. Tax collectors, 
taxpayers, and the diverse tax intermediaries (lawyers, accountants, fixers) have the capacity 
to both benefit and damage their counterparts. If taxpayers are generally resistant and 
uncooperative, they can make it costly for tax collectors to extract money from them. 
Taxpayers may be able to purchase or otherwise mobilise support from politicians. But tax 
collectors can also impose costs on non-cooperative taxpayers, including through: (a) 
demanding extensive documentation; (b) repeated audits; (c) making large assessments that 
can only be contested in court or, worse, in appeals processes effectively controlled by the tax 
authorities themselves; or (d) physically detaining shipments of goods, especially at Customs 
(Moore forthcoming).  
 
In most cases, taxpayers and tax collectors have an interest in establishing cooperative 
relationships and reaching some kind of informal equilibrium agreement about how much tax 
will be paid in given circumstances. The extent to which these ‘equilibrium agreements’ are 
designed to meet either (a) the personal and institutional interests of the tax collectors or (b) 
the interests of the public treasury, is central to the effectiveness and legitimacy of different 
tax systems (Section 2). Even where the public interest is uppermost, tax collectors do not set 
out solely or dominantly to enforce in detail the legal tax obligations of every taxpayer. They 
set out to collect what they believe they can reasonably or sensibly collect, taking into account 
such factors as: (a) the additional revenue that might result if they put more effort into 
communicating with or investigating individual taxpayers; (b) the incentives they face to keep 
taxpayers cooperative by not irritating them; and (c) at the high end of contemporary tax 
practice, information from statistically-based assessments of the likelihood that particular 
taxpayers will be significant defaulters. In every country, a great deal of theoretically tax-liable 
income, transactions or assets escape the tax net. The important differences lie in whether 
these resources are not taxed because the administrative costs of pursuing them or of 
irritating taxpayers are too high, or whether political influence and corruption play a big role in 
enabling some people and companies to escape their obligations. 
 
One of the important implications of the prevalence of informal bargaining in tax policy and 
administration is that, even in the absence of corruption or the direct use of political 
connections, tax regimes tend to be biased in favour of those taxpayers with the greatest 
bargaining power, i.e. those who can most easily evade or avoid taxes, and whose 
cooperation is most valuable in the long term. Provided they can find other taxpayers to take 
up the burden, governments routinely ‘under-tax’ – or find some other way of rewarding – 
their major reliable sources of tax revenue.17 
 
Classifying the obstacles to increasing tax revenues 
 
There are many partial answers to the question: why do the governments of low income 
countries not raise more tax revenues? If they are to be practically useful, the answers need 
to be classified as well as listed. They could be classified in many different ways. The 
classification used here was shaped by the purpose of the paper: to provide UNRISD with 
                                                 
16  Daunton’s (2001)  account of the evolution of taxation in nineteenth century Britain illustrates this point in detail.  
17  For a theoretical and empirical elaboration of this argument, see Gehlbach (2008). For supportive evidence from 
contemporary China, see Choi (2009). 
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some guidance in researching the question of how tax revenues could be increased. I have 
classified the obstacles to higher tax collection into eight main groups. In presenting them, I 
start with the more fundamental economic and political factors that seem to explain both the 
stickiness of tax takes within individual countries and the long term variation in tax takes 
among countries. I then move to issues that are both more ‘technical’ and, in most cases, 
provide the greatest scope for positive policy change in the medium term. The eight sets of 
obstacles, which are discussed in Sections 1 to 7, are: 
 
 The constraints arising from economic structure 
 The use of the tax system for rent-taking 
 The use of the tax system as a direct instrument of rule 
 The influence of interest group politics 
 The configuration of governing institutions 
 The difficulties of taxing transnational transactions 
 Insufficient use of advanced tax administration practices 
 The property tax issue. 
 
There is some inevitable overlap among these categories: some issues could appear under 
two or more heads. 
 
Note that I have not tried to list those factors that are somewhere believed consistently to 
affect revenue raising but do not in practice seem to do so. Possibly the most important 
among these is foreign aid. There is a widespread view that aid will to some degree act as a 
substitute for revenue-raising on the part of recipient governments: the more aid governments 
receive, the less effort they will put into raising their own revenues (see, for example, Knack 
2009). This proposition may be true. But the evidence generally does not seem to support it. 
Insofar as we have evidence, it seems to point in all directions. We do not know how aid 
affects the local tax effort. The relationships are likely complex, and dependent on the type of 
aid, who is giving it, why, how, and in what circumstances (Prichard et al. 2012). 
 
Finally, with the exception of property taxes (Section 8), I have not dealt with the question of 
whether particular types of taxes are especially appropriate to low income countries. Individual 
specialists sometimes have strong views about the advantages of, for example, flat taxes, 
bank turnover taxes or VAT to low income countries. However, as I explained above, radical 
changes in tax regimes do not seem to be on the agenda at present. We can assume that, for 
the foreseeable future, the tax collectors in most low income countries will continue to depend 
principally on some mixture of the revenue sources with which they are currently familiar: 
corporate and personal income taxes; Customs duties; VAT (or general sales taxes); excise 
duties (levied on commodities like fuel, tobacco and alcohol); specific transactions taxes 
(stamp duties); social security contributions; and a host of other minor sources.  
 
 
1  The constraints arising from economic 
structure 
 
The governments of low income countries raise significantly less of their GDP in taxes (and 
in non-tax revenues) than do the governments of richer countries. This is not a new 
phenomenon. To the contrary, it appears to have been a constant feature in economic 
history since sufficient data became available to make such calculations possible. The 
proposition that the proportion of national income collected as taxes tends continually to 
increase as countries become richer was formulated as Wagner’s Law in 1877. It has proven 
to be one of the more robust and longstanding empirical propositions in social science. In 
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fact, econometric analyses consistently demonstrate that two sets of variables relating to the 
structure of national economies explain a large proportion of variations in the tax take.18 The 
first set is average per capita income levels and associated measures of the extent of 
urbanisation and the size of the non-agricultural economy. The second set is measures of 
openness to international trade: typically the ratio of imports and exports to GDP.  
 
1.1 The effects of income and the sectoral composition of the economy 
 
Why do per capita income levels, urbanisation and non-agricultural occupations consistently 
predict high tax takes? Wagner believed that the motive force lay in steadily increasing 
popular demands for public spending to allay the adverse effects of industrialism and 
urbanisation. These factors may play some role, but the consistency of the statistical 
relationship between tax take and these features of economic structure, both over time and 
among countries, suggests the primary role of a more structural and less immediately 
political explanation. In sum, tax takes are low in low income countries because the structure 
of their economies makes taxing difficult.  
 
One important dimension of economic structure is the high incidence in low income countries 
of economic relationships of the kind summed up in the term ‘informal sector’. Informal 
economic transactions are hard to tax almost by definition.19 This is especially true of labour 
markets. Because the governments of the wealthier and more capitalist OECD countries 
require employers to operate PAYE (Pay As You Earn) systems to collect personal income 
taxes from employees, personal income taxes are their largest single source of public 
revenue. Social security contributions, mostly also collected and paid by employers, are also 
significant. By contrast, the governments of low income countries depend more on taxing 
companies. The ratio of corporate to personal income tax revenues is 0.3:1 in the high income 
OECD countries, and 1.4:1 in the low income countries (Table 1, row k). However, informality 
is but one aspect of the differences in economic structure between high and low income 
economies. To understand the broader picture, it is useful to begin with a general look at the 
logistics of the taxing process.20 
 
There is a developmental logic in tax systems, which can be expressed in terms of a contrast 
between two (idealised) modes of assessing the liabilities of individual taxpayers: physical 
verification and accounts-based verification. Physical verification can be considered to be the 
original mode. It has typically been used in the collection of land and crop taxes, property 
taxes, customs duties, sumptuary taxes on conspicuous consumption, and excise taxes on 
the production of scarce consumer items like salt, tobacco and alcohol. Physical verification is 
almost inevitably associated with the merging of assessment with collection: the same person 
who assesses taxpayers’ liabilities also collects the money from them. For this reason, 
physical verification is typically associated with malfeasance: collectors use their power to 
extort money from the taxpayer and/or to cheat the exchequer.  
 
Accounts-based verification, which has its roots mainly in corporate and personal income or 
profits taxes, creates three developmental opportunities. One is the employment of revenue 
agents whose skills lie more in accounting and law rather than in muscle power and force. The 
second is the increased scope for separating the process of assessing tax liabilities from the 
task of actually collecting the money due, thus reducing the scope for extortion or corruption. 
The third, which applies mainly to digitalisation, is the enormous potential for improving the 
level and efficiency of collection by matching data from different sources. Some tax agencies 
                                                 
18  For a recent summary of a long series of statistical analyses of these issues, see Gupta (2007: Appendix D) and, for 
more recent reconfirmation, see Pessino and Fenochietto (2010). 
19  For an excellent recent review of the literature on this topic, see Joshi et al. (2012). 
20  The analysis in the following paragraphs derives immediately from Moore (2013). A wide range of sources are cited 
there. 
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in low-income countries still do little data analysis beyond tracking their own collection 
performance. Digitalisation makes possible data matching and analysis exercises that greatly 
change working methods and improve outcomes for both tax collectors and taxpayers (Bird 
and Zolt 2008).  
 
As economies become less agrarian, more marketised, and better recorded – first on paper 
and then digitally – there is a ‘natural’ trend toward accounts-based taxation. Accounts-based 
taxation has the potential greatly to reduce the friction that inevitably exists between taxpayers 
and tax collectors. It is less adversarial and more efficient than taxation based on physical 
verification (Vázquez-Caro and Bird 2010). That in turn helps explain a paradox. On the one 
hand, historically-minded observers tend to associate taxation with revolt and rebellion (e.g. 
numberless peasant revolts, the English Civil War in the sixteenth century, the French 
Revolution, the Boston Tea Party, resistance to colonial hut and head taxes in Africa, etc.). On 
the other hand, contemporary governments extract much higher proportions of their citizens’ 
income in taxes than did their historical predecessors while facing miniscule risks of violent tax 
revolts. One reason is that, in high tax countries, taxpayers usually obtain visible returns from 
their tax contributions, notably in terms of social services and social transfers of various kinds. 
Another is that most accounts-based taxation is less visible and inflammatory than taxation 
based on physical verification. It is associated with: 
 
 The extensive use of ‘tax practitioners’ (variously: lawyers, accountants, fixers) to 
prepare and present taxpayers’ accounts to tax collectors. This reduces the direct 
face-to-face interaction between taxpayers and tax collectors – visits by tax collectors 
to shops, offices, warehouses, fields and homes – that is characteristic of physical 
verification systems. The immediate effect of face-to-face interaction is an increase in 
the opportunities and incentives for both sides to engage in corrupt deals at the 
expense of the public treasury.21 The longer term effects include less efficient revenue 
collection and the de-legitimisation of tax agencies.  
 The widespread use of withholding, which can be defined colloquially as a process to 
enable tax collectors to get their hands on tax money that is due before it reaches the 
pocket of the agent formally liable to pay it. Private sector agents withhold some 
proportion of the money they would normally transfer to another private agent, and 
instead remit it to the tax agency as an advance, pre-emptive tax contribution. Banks 
deduct withholding taxes from the interest they pay their depositors. Incorporated 
companies do the same for dividend payments. Under PAYE schemes for personal 
income taxes and social security payments, employers withhold from employees’ pay 
cheques.22 The practice of withholding is central to the capacity to levy high tax takes. 
It is very much easier to persuade taxpayers to part with money that they have not yet 
received than to extract it from their pockets once it is lodged there.  
 More generally, the routinisation of information transfer and of tax payments, that they 
can be spread over the year and triggered according to a pre-determined schedule. 
 
Relative to physical verification systems, accounts-based tax systems routinise the tax 
process, stimulate less direct engagement between taxpayer and tax collector, create fewer 
points of conflict, irritate and mobilise the taxpayer less, and reduce collection costs for the 
tax agency.23 The core objective of contemporary tax administration reform is to intensify 
these characteristics, making tax collection more routine, more dependent on digital 
                                                 
21  This is a standard assumption made in much economic analysis of taxation, and is accepted by tax administration 
specialists. For recent evidence, see Imam and Jacobs (2007). 
22  In a functionally similar way, larger companies serve as agents for the collection of VAT. 
23  The case of property taxes helps illustrate this conclusion. Even in high income countries where taxation is largely 
accounts-based, property taxes lack the emollient characteristics of most other taxes. There are no intermediaries 
between the taxpayer and the tax collector, which is typically a very visible local presence – a local council. The 
assessments of individual properties are typically done by assessors, in personal visits. Re-valuations are done 
sporadically, and inevitably are accompanied by negative publicity. It is partly for these reasons that property taxes are 
greatly under-used (Section 8). 
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processes, and more predictable (Section 7). In modern tax systems, taxpayers experience 
personal interaction, if at all, with a range of functionally-specialised staff (assessors, help-
line personnel, customer advisers, collectors, debt collectors), rather than the dominant 
single figure of the local Tax Inspector who, in some low income countries, still does the 
assessments, collects the money, handles the grievances, gives the advice, and generally 
monopolises the relationship of individual taxpayers to the collection agency.  
 
1.2 The effects of international trade 
 
It is clear why a high ratio of imports and exports should lead to a high tax take. International 
trade is the classic, core, default source of state income. Historically, rulers have found it 
relatively easy, both politically and organisationally, to raise much of their revenue at their 
borders. Governments that find it difficult to collect revenue continue to depend relatively 
heavily on this default source – although it is often very inefficient because a high proportion 
of taxes collected at the border may not end up in the public treasury (Section 2). Despite 
major reductions in trade tariffs in recent decades, governments of low income countries still 
depend relatively heavily for revenues on taxes on international trade, especially on imports 
(Table 1).  
 
While econometric studies consistently find that the ratio of international trade to GDP helps 
determine the overall tax take, the results are not very consistent among different studies: the 
magnitudes of the causal effects are quite variable, and the ratio of exports to GDP is 
sometimes not associated with the size of the tax take in a statistically significant way. There 
appear to be two broad reasons. One is that the underlying statistical relationships – the 
values of the coefficients in econometric estimations – have changed in recent decades as a 
result of trade and tax policy reforms in low income countries in particular. Especially in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, many governments imposed heavy taxes on exports of agricultural 
commodities like cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, rubber, sisal, sugar and tea (Bates 1977). 
In more recent decades, those taxes have mostly been lifted (Bezemer and Headey 2008). 
Similarly, since the 1980s, most low and middle income countries have reduced trade tariffs, 
sometimes radically.24  
 
The other broad reason for the inconsistency of the econometric results is that the data on 
international trade and revenues from it has become less reliable in one major respect. Since 
around 2000, the global prices of commodities, especially mining and energy commodities (oil 
and gas), have increased considerably. Low income countries have become relatively more 
important sources of these commodities. But transnational companies seeking to minimise 
their taxes have increasingly been using accounting practices that change the recorded 
location of their activities, exports, imports, incomes and profits. This is especially the case 
with mining products, and with mining activities in low income countries (Lundstøl et al. 2012). 
The extent to which these commodity exports are actually taxed and the accuracy of both the 
export and the revenue figures would all affect econometric estimations of the relations 
between export ratios and tax takes.25  
 
The interim conclusion is that, while higher ratios of international trade to GNP boost the tax 
take, it is hard to calculate that effect with any precision for contemporary low income 
                                                 
24  In many cases, VAT was introduced more or less simultaneously. Lower income countries in particular often found that 
enhanced VAT revenue did not fully compensate for lost tariff revenue, probably in large part because they often 
introduced rather ‘truncated’ or incomplete VAT systems that both included many exemptions and failed to create the 
incentives for the ‘matching’ of invoices in business-to-business transactions that lies at the heart of the capacity of well-
designed and well-managed VAT systems to reduce tax evasion (Baunsgaard and Keen 2005).   
25  Another result of the tax avoidance strategies used by transnational companies is that the intangible services that 
constitute a growing proportion of international trade (intellectual property rights, internet-based transactions) are also 
often badly measured at the level of individual country. This too may complicate the statistical estimation of the effect of 
international trade ratios on the tax take. At present, the magnitudes of such transactions are tiny in most low income 
economies.  
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countries. And that in turn reduces our ability to produce more precise quantitative estimates 
of the impact on the tax take of the other important set of variables relating to the structure of 
national economies: income levels and sectoral composition of the economy.  
 
1.3 Economic structure and the tax take; conclusion 
 
The tax take is broadly proportional to national income levels in large part because, in higher 
income (and urbanised, non-agricultural) countries, it is much easier for tax agencies to tap 
into revenue sources without incurring high collection costs or generating adverse political 
reactions. It is important to emphasise this relationship because of the frequency with which 
observers assume or assert that it is primarily because of politics or policy that tax takes in 
low income countries (or in Africa, Latin America, etc.) do not come close to the levels of 30-
45 per cent found in most OECD countries (Table 1). It makes no sense for low income 
countries to aim to match OECD tax take levels. 
 
However, it is equally important to insist that the statistical relationship between economic 
structure and the tax take is not in any strong sense of the term ‘determinant’. Countries with 
similar incomes and economic structures can have very different tax takes. In some cases, 
other historical or structural factors play a role. For example, differing modes of colonial 
exploitation of the economies of Africa are still (statistically) detectable today in variations 
among African countries in the total tax take (Mkandawire 2010). But we really do not know 
the relative importance of these various structural factors, and how far they affect 
contemporary efforts to increase the tax take. 
 
Three practical conclusions emerge: 
 
 Do not use the size of the tax take as an indicator of how effectively governments are 
tapping into their tax base, either cross-sectionally or over time. The concept of ‘tax 
effort’ is more useful. The most common method of calculating ‘tax effort’ involves 
starting with a statistical estimate of what one would expect the tax take of any given 
country to be in the light of its economic structure. ‘Tax effort’ is then estimated as the 
difference between that predicted tax take and the actual tax take.26  
 However, estimates of tax effort made in this way – from residuals in equations 
whose coefficients tend to vary from one data set to another – cannot be very precise. 
Further, these estimates may be of little help to policymakers seeking a realistic 
estimate of how much tax might reasonably be collected in any specific country.27 
 There is no reason to believe that economic structure – or other structural and 
historical factors – so tightly determine tax takes that arguments for improving tax 
policy and tax administration are in any way weakened. There is scope to improve 
revenue performance in every country.  
 
 
2  The use of the tax system for rent-taking 
 
There is a large and impressive body of social and historical theory that explores the 
relationships between government, taxation and patterns of political and economic 
development.28 The major authors have mostly presented taxation as a political game 
involving two main categories of actors: political executives (‘rulers’) and (various categories 
                                                 
26  See for example IMF (2011: 59-62). The estimates there relating to 36 low and lower-middle income countries over the 
period 1991-2006 show that the tax effort varied between 41 per cent (Bangladesh) and 96 per cent (Côte d’Ivoire).  
27  For guidance on that issue, see Cyan et al. (2013). 
28  See for example Chaudhry (1997); Dincecco (2011); Levi (1988); Mann (1993); Tilly (1992); Yun Casalilla and O'Brien 
(2012). 
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of) taxpayers. That simplification is often adequate for the purposes of ‘big history’. But it can 
be very misleading when the objective is to understand the obstacles to raising tax revenues 
in low income countries today (Moore forthcoming). The tax collection process involves a 
wider range of significant actors. It is better to start from the assumption that there are at 
least four main categories of actors and interests, each of them internally differentiated: 
taxpayers, tax intermediaries, governments (i.e. central political executives) and revenue 
collection organisations.  
 
Tax intermediaries are important and numerous in low income countries. They include tax 
lawyers; accountants; clearing agents, forwarding agents, brokers and managers of bonded 
warehouses (for Customs); formal associations of any of these professions; support staff 
employed directly and unofficially by official tax collectors; and the many taxpaying 
organisations authorised and required to collect tax from others and pass it to formal tax 
agencies (Section 1).29 In Nigeria at least, a considerable fraction of the business of formal tax 
collection, especially at the sub-national level, is in practice sub-contracted to people who 
would historically have been labelled ‘tax farmers’ (Omoigui Okauru 2013). I do not in this 
paper explore the roles played by these tax intermediaries. Here I focus rather on the 
ambiguities associated with formal tax collection agencies. We cannot assume that they are 
the agents of the political executive or the public treasury, accustomed to following the 
instructions given from above and collecting money solely for transfer to the treasury. It is of 
course true that no organisation is ever 100 per cent the agent of the organisation that is 
formally its principal. The subordinate agent always has a little scope to determine its own 
agenda and to hide relevant information from its principal. But, in the case of some tax 
agencies in low income countries, the degree of divergence from a principal-agent relationship 
seems substantial.30 First, tax collection agencies collect revenue not only for the public 
treasury, but also for a range of other actors: their own staff; their political masters; and tax 
intermediaries. Second, and largely because of the extent to which they provide continuous 
‘informal’ funding for their political masters, their relationship to their formal principals – 
typically ministers of finance, sometimes prime ministers or presidents – may be more 
complex and less hierarchical than is implied in the formal organisation chart.   
 
These rent-taking activities, and the partial political autonomy that this generates for revenue 
collection agents, are dependent on the capacity of revenue collection agencies to raise more 
money from taxpayers than appears in the official records.31 Stories about corrupt tax officials 
are as old as tax collection itself. Today it is widely believed that the (Customs) organisations 
that collect taxes at international borders are better placed to extract rents than other tax 
agencies. In many low income countries at least, there is visibly more money around the staff 
and offices of Customs agencies than of ‘internal’ tax authorities.32 
 
                                                 
29  Cantens’ (2012, footnote 5) figures for 2010 suggest that, relative to the volume of cargo handled, Customs 
intermediaries were about 22-26 times as numerous in the ports of Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) and Douala (Cameroon) as in 
Le Havre (France). 
30  I say ‘seems’ because we have no conclusive evidence, and have to rely on a mixture of fragmentary pieces of research 
and the unattributable information from insiders. 
31  In using the term ‘autonomy’, I am referring to actual political relationships, and not to the formal, legal autonomy 
granted to so-called ‘autonomous’ or ‘semi-autonomous’ revenue agencies. These may have little real autonomy 
(Fjeldstad and Moore 2009). 
32  This situation is likely to change, and to a limited degree is already changing in low income countries. On the one hand, 
some countries are taking advantage of digital technologies to introduce ‘preferred trader’ schemes that permit trusted 
importers and exporters to declare and clear all their shipments in advance and pass through border points without any 
routine physical checks. On the other hand, the dominant source of tax rent-taking and fraud in higher income countries 
is now ‘carousel schemes’ that essentially involve false trade documentation to make false claims for VAT refunds on 
exports. These schemes require only limited cooperation from within revenue agencies, at the back-office level rather 
than at border posts. Such frauds are likely to become more common in low income countries if they continue to 
introduce increasingly ‘textbook’ implementation procedures into their (generally simplified) VAT systems, notably by 
increasing their willingness actually to remit VAT payments to exporters.   
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How does rent-taking work in practice? A number of pieces of recent detailed and often 
quantitative anthropological and survey research collectively throw significant analytical light 
on these processes, especially in respect of Customs .33 The following findings recur: 
 
(1) Almost all illegal payments to Customs staff are made by intermediaries on behalf of 
their clients.  
(2) Relationships between intermediaries and Customs staff are to a significant degree 
driven by incentives on both sides to minimise the potential adverse effects on the 
flow of business of the high degree of friction and conflict that is intrinsic to the 
operation. While Customs staff have the power to inflict very high costs on ‘non-
cooperative’ customers by detaining or confiscating goods, or by exercising discretion 
about classifications and valuation, they also need, on pain of various kinds of 
administrative punishment, to keep business running smoothly in order to meet their 
regular revenue collection targets. 
(3) There are corresponding pressures for all parties to reach understandings – possibly 
independently of formal procedures and policies – and to assist one another where 
possible. For example, individual Customs officers or units might rely on their larger 
customers to pay dues very quickly – or even in advance – in order that they do not 
fall behind their schedule in remitting collections to the public treasury.  
(4) There are high levels of informal organisation on both sides. Networks of Customs 
officers, in which power and authority do not always accord to the formal hierarchy, 
organise the flow of collective informal earnings, both internally and externally to 
powerful politicians. Associations of intermediaries might receive some of these 
informal earnings to meet their collective expenses.  
(5) While there exist collective mechanisms to regulate the collection and redistribution of 
informal earnings, these are neither comprehensive nor fully transparent to all 
participants. Individual Customs officers may also collect on a personal basis. 
Because of incomplete information and competition over informal earnings, conflicts 
may erupt periodically.  
(6) Moving staff between posts with different potentials for informal earnings is a major 
mechanism for the internal exercise of authority. 
(7) Different border posts within the same country are often in competition with one 
another for business. They try to attract traders with combinations of lower charges, 
predictability, and efficient service.  
(8) On land border posts in particular, Customs agencies may both compete and 
cooperate with one or more other state institutions (the military, environmental or 
health regulation agencies) to collect money from traders. 
(9) These various collection agencies may routinely use local non-state agents – criminal 
gangs, taxi drivers – to obtain information on attempts to bypass border posts, and to 
punish offenders.  
 
We have no hard information on the extent to which revenue agencies aggregate and transfer 
funds informally and illegally to their political masters. These flows seem to be quantitatively 
and politically significant in many low income countries. This in turn probably helps explain 
why it is often so difficult to reform tax collection agencies to improve their performance. 
Especially in that minority of tax agencies that have made very little use of digital technologies 
and in which revenue is raised through close personal interactions between individual staff 
members and individual taxpayers, any kind of reform can appear threatening, to individual 
officers and to the complex flows of illegal rents in which they participate. Staff collectively 
have a high capacity to resist reform. Governments need money continuously. This is 
especially true for the governments of poorer countries, which find it difficult to borrow money 
                                                 
33  Amin and Hoppe (2013); Bilangna and Djeuwo (2013); Cantens (2012); Cuvelier and Mumbunda (2013); Titeca (2009); 
Titeca and Kimanuka (2012). There is less research material on corruption in ‘internal’ tax collection. For an example, 
see Fjeldstad (2007). 
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commercially in a flexible fashion. The potential revenue and economic costs to government 
of whispered ‘tax collection strikes’ are very high. The richness of tax collectors’ informal 
knowledge and networks makes them irreplaceable outside situations of extreme crisis. The 
iconic cases of radical reform of tax administration in poor countries in recent decades – 
notably Peru in the early 1990s (Durand 2002), Uganda in the later 1990s and early in the 
2000s (Therkildsen 2004), and Rwanda over a similar period (Land 2004) happened when 
state power was effectively reconstituted after near-collapse, including the breakdown of 
revenue collection. The tax collectors had already lost their bargaining power.  
 
It seems obvious that rent-taking of the kind sketched out above reduces tax takes, in two 
ways. Directly, money that is legally scheduled for the public treasury goes instead into the 
hands of tax collectors, tax intermediaries, politicians and taxpayers. The volumes may be 
large. Recent World Bank research in West Africa suggests that recorded cross-border trade 
might be a small fraction of actual trade and that, while unofficial payments made at borders 
and frequent road blocks account for a high proportion of road transport costs, they may still 
often amount to less than the Customs duties that should in principle be levied.34 Indirectly, 
the inevitable popular perception that tax collection is corrupt will tend to undermine any 
efforts made to persuade citizens that paying their taxes is either a civic duty or a means of 
enhancing collective welfare. ‘Tax morale’ and the extent of quasi-voluntary compliance 
remain low (Cummings et al. 2005; Torgler 2004,  2005).  
 
Whether direct assaults on ‘corruption’ within tax agencies are the best means of increasing 
revenue collection is beyond the scope of this paper. There is no good evidence on this. It is 
however hard to think of a recent case where anti-corruption measures alone – as opposed 
to the body of technological and organisational reforms in which they can be embedded – 
have made a significant contribution to raising the tax take.35  
 
 
3  The use of the tax system as a direct 
instrument of rule 
 
If raising formal revenues were the dominant motivation for governments to establish and 
maintain tax systems, how could we explain the extent to which, even in low income 
countries where governments find it hard to raise revenues, they routinely give away a third 
or more of their potential annual tax income by granting large numbers of tax exemptions or 
tax holidays of various kinds?36 The broad answer to that question is that tax agencies, like 
most public institutions, rarely serve a single purpose. They attract a range of actors who try 
to colonise or influence them for specific purposes. That is especially true of tax agencies 
                                                 
34  Amin and Hoppe (2013). See also Cantens et al. (2013); Cuvelier and Mumbunda (2013); and Titeca and Kimanuka 
(2012). Transparency International does annual surveys of the experiences of the population of the East African 
Community countries of being asked for and paying bribes to specific organisations. In 2011, 115 organisations were 
listed. The Burundi Revenue Authority ranked 3rd highest in overall corruption levels; the Uganda Revenue Authority 5th; 
the Tanzania Revenue Authority 33rd; and the Kenya Revenue Authority 58th. In Rwanda, reported corruption was so 
low that it was statistically invisible (Transparency International 2012: 1-3). These figures may be cited as evidence 
either that corruption events are widespread in the tax field or very variable among countries. 
35  For an interesting recent insight into how Customs may be reformed to reduce corruption, see Rabelland and Rajaram 
(2013). Note also that the increasing scope for experienced tax administrators from low income countries to work 
internationally at international salaries (Moore 2013) provides incentives for some of them to become recognised 
reformers. 
36  The calculation of the extent of tax exemptions is challenging, both conceptually and practically. There is no single 
agreed method. Most estimates are approximate, and many are informal and/or confidential to tax authorities. In a 
recent publication, the OECD chose to cite figures from recent estimates of the volume of tax exemptions in six African 
countries (OECD 2013b: 10). I assume these are from more reliable sources. On average, tax exemptions amounted to 
33 per cent of tax revenue collected (the range was 12.5 per cent to 60 per cent), and to 5.5 per cent of GDP (range 3.4 
per cent to 10 per cent). Some tax specialists fear that exemptions are becoming more rather than less common. 
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and of the policing agencies that they broadly resemble. The wide powers that tax agencies 
enjoy to raise money from the public enables the people who control them to use those 
powers selectively to favour some people and companies, through tax exemptions, and to 
disadvantage or threaten others, through punitive tax audits. In polities in which there are 
inadequate mechanisms to restrain or hold to account the political executive (i.e. the core 
power holders: ministers of finance, prime ministers, cabinets, presidents, etc.), tax systems 
may be used in these ways not just to raise the resources needed to enable governments to 
rule, but as direct instruments of rule in their own right. 
 
Taking a scholastic perspective, ‘tax exemption’ could be defined very broadly, to cover every 
case in which the notion of ‘equal treatment’ could be considered violated by the failure to tax 
some activity. For example, very small business enterprises with a turnover below an annual 
threshold are exempted from some taxes in most countries for pragmatic reasons: the costs of 
trying to tax them are likely to eat up all or most of the revenue extracted. A purist might 
consider this to be a tax exemption. But that scholastic approach makes it virtually impossible 
to calculate the levels of exemptions in any country, and is of no practical value. The practical 
touchstone for deciding whether some provision should be counted as a tax exemption has to 
be whether the activity sensibly and reasonably could be taxed, with the implication that it has 
been exempted for a specific reason. In practice, most of the exemptions with which we are 
concerned are visibly discretionary. They are in principle granted to specified activities (e.g. 
income attributable to owned patents; leasing finance; new investments in sailboat 
manufacturing; imports of high grade fuel oil) but in practice are granted mainly to individual 
companies, to narrowly-defined industrial sectors, or to companies located in a specific 
geographical area (e.g. an export processing zone). Exemptions can take a variety of legal 
forms, including time-bound tax holidays, accelerated depreciation allowances, and 
permanent exemptions from particular taxes. They may cover one tax, several taxes, or all 
taxes. They may be granted by a single agency within government (the revenue authority, the 
ministry of finance, the ministry of industries, the investment promotion board) or by several. 
There may be clear criteria and procedures for granting exemptions, or none except the word 
of the president. The beneficiaries may or may not be required to register with the revenue 
authority and file returns so that their compliance can be monitored and revenue from non-
exempt activities collected.  
 
There is a debate in principle about the desirability of tax exemptions of any kind.37 Supporters 
argue that governments should have the power to use tax exemptions to encourage certain 
kinds of economic activities and investments. Critics argue either that it is undesirable in 
principle for governments to try to shape market decisions in this way or that governments 
cannot be trusted to use this power appropriately. The facts about tax exemptions in low 
income countries, contested and fragmented as they are, give a great deal of support to the 
latter position. If governments were granting tax exemptions purely in the pursuit of economic 
growth and innovation,38 they would be consistently following a number of practices, including: 
 
 Giving exemptions only on the basis of clear criteria and agreed, transparent and 
contestable procedures 
 Placing time limits on all exemptions 
 Monitoring their use and outcomes 
 Ensuring that all exemptions and investors were registered with the revenue authority, 
so that the enterprise could be taxed after the expiry of exemptions.  
 
                                                 
37  See Cleeve (2008); Gauthier and Reinikka (2006); Madies and Dethier (2010); Tax Justice Network-Africa and Action 
Aid International (2012); and James (2010). 
38  If the objective of exemptions is simply to signal through the tax regime that the country is ‘open to business’ for foreign 
investors, a general reduction in tax rates would be more appropriate than selective exemptions.  
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The fact that these practices are far from standard in low income countries supports the view 
that a major motivation is political.39  Research strongly and repeatedly reinforces the 
argument that, however desirable some tax exemptions or incentives might be in principle, 
current levels are unjustified and procedures for granting them require major reform.40 Few 
political scientists have investigated the political rationale for exemptions in a consistent 
fashion. We mostly have to guess the extent to which they are granted in exchange for broad 
political support, party and political funding, or simple bribes. A recent paper by Ole 
Therkildsen (2012) constitutes an interesting exception. He finds that a major driver of the 
spread of tax exemptions in Tanzania is increasing group competition within the ruling CCM 
party, and thus an ever-widening trawl for political finance to fund that competition. Business 
offers political financing in return for tax exemptions.41  
 
The power to tax – and therefore the power to grant tax exemptions – is not just a means of 
raising financial resources for the state. It is also – and especially in polities characterised by 
low levels of democratic institutionalisation and legitimacy – a basic and direct instrument of 
rule. It can be used as both carrot and stick: to generate support and to discourage 
oppositional activity. On the one side, the threat of a special tax audit is a coercive means of 
aligning wealth to power. Actual or potential political opponents of the government, or even 
companies and individuals that are unwilling to provide financial support to the people in 
power can be intimidated by the threat or fact of an audit. This is often a powerful political 
signal.42 On the other side, tax exemptions are a widespread means of generating financial 
contributions and other influential support for individual politicians and political parties.43 To 
the extent that this analysis of the political motivations for tax exemptions is correct, the 
prospects for reducing their incidence in low income countries seems limited. The battle is 
however worth fighting, for they are a significant cause of low revenue collections and of the 
de-legitimation of tax systems generally. 
 
 
4  The influence of interest group politics 
 
There is no doubt that, through their direct and indirect engagement in political activity, socio-
economic interest groups exercise a large and continuous influence on tax policy and tax 
administration in virtually all political jurisdictions. Any other conclusion would be surprising, 
because it would violate our understanding that humans are intrinsically political animals. 
Taxes are involuntary contributions to government income, extracted to some degree 
through coercion, and unmatched by specific promises or contracts about the uses to which 
they will be put. Just as both small and large taxpayers engage, if they can, in individual or 
small-group bargaining with tax collectors and governments to reduce their payments below 
the formal norm (Section 2), they also engage in more collective politics to influence both the 
distribution of the tax burden and the (related) patterns of public spending and borrowing. 
Most political science literature on taxation deals mainly with distributional issues: i.e. interest 
group political competition over the distribution of the taxing burden and the spending 
benefits. The broad patterns of taxation politics are relatively predictable:  
 
                                                 
39  I am very indebted to the verbal address on these issues delivered by Richard Bird to the Annual Meeting of the 
International Centre for Tax and Development in Cape Town on 13 December 2012.   
40  James (2010); Klemm (2009); Klemm and Parys (2012); Li (2006); and Zee et al. (2002). 
41  This raises the question of whether the widening of electoral competition in sub-Saharan Africa helps explain the 
apparent increase in the frequency of tax exemptions. 
42  For example, after the former Youth League leader Justin Malema was expelled from the ruling African National 
Congress in South Africa in 2012, he was found to owe 16 million rand to the South African Revenue Authority. 
43  Similarly, Pierre Englebert (2009: 72-4) argues that one of the instruments used by national political authorities in Africa 
to purchase a degree of tactical loyalty to the regime on the part of potentially separatist local elites is to hand them 
unregulated local taxing powers. Those powers are often employed arbitrarily and coercively to extract rents for the 
groups that control local government (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008; Prud'homme 1992). 
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 Material interests play a major role in the establishment of political alignments. For 
example, companies will tend to prefer that additional revenue should be raised 
through increased VAT rates, which are borne by consumers, and not through 
additional corporate income taxes.   
 Because of the legal and accounting complexities of taxing, budgeting and public 
spending processes, there is considerable scope for politicians to choose the ways in 
which taxation and fiscal policy issues are framed, and for information to be 
misrepresented in political debate.44 
 The institutional arrangements through which fiscal decisions are made sometimes 
have a significant impact on fiscal politics and outcomes (see Section 5). 
 
Tax is very political. We can be sure that interest group competition has a great influence on 
the distribution of tax burdens. But does it also affect the aggregate tax take in any consistent 
way? We have no confident answer to this question.45 I suggest and then explain two tentative 
conclusions, both related to the ways in which the degree of income or wealth inequality might 
affect the tax take indirectly through its influence on interest group politics: 
 
 High levels of income or wealth inequality within a country probably tend to reduce 
overall taxation levels. 
 Effective ‘fiscal contracting’ – the exchange of revenue contributions from specific, 
differentiated taxpayer groups for preferred spending patterns on the part of 
government – is more likely if income is more equally distributed. 
 
4.1 The effects of high inequality on the tax take  
 
Political economy theorists who rely more on deduction from abstract principles than from 
empirical observation have argued that higher levels of income or wealth inequality within a 
democratic country tend to increase overall taxation levels (Corbacho et al. 2013: chapter 2). 
The logic is that the higher the degree of inequality, the larger the proportion of voters who 
can expect, without facing higher tax bills themselves, to benefit from higher taxation on the 
rich and subsequent increased public spending. The historical experience of Latin America 
has long constituted a challenge to that expectation. It has long been characterised by high 
degrees of inequality and low tax takes, with little evidence that episodes of democracy 
wrought any appreciable change. In 1976 Michael Best (1976) published a classic article on 
the subject that presents a set of arguments that, while quite general and incomplete in 
detail, seem broadly accurate at the level of broad-brush historical interpretation. The core 
schematic elements of the argument are:46 
 
 Latin American economic elites had little general interest in high public spending, and 
would support it only in contexts where they clearly stood to gain, including some 
military spending and, more commonly, high subsidies for public universities, that 
largely catered to their own children. They would otherwise purchase their own health 
and education services – and some policing – rather than risk having to meet the cost 
of broad public provision of these services. 
 While electoral verdicts on these issues often went against them, they would, even in 
democracies, be able to ensure – through legislation, through apparently obscure 
constitutional provisions, through their influence over the judiciary, and through their 
governance institutions that separated tax policy decisions from public spending 
decisions (Section 5) – that (a) the tax burden was skewed toward consumption taxes 
and thus onto the poor, and (b) the overall tax take remained low.  
                                                 
44  This is especially true where there are restrictions on the acquisition and use of information and on political competition.  
45  One issue that has been researched relatively intensively in Latin America is whether the ideological complexion of 
governments affects the tax take. The answers are ambiguous (Corbacho et al. 2013: 34-36; Hart 2010) 
46  See also Corbacho et al. (2013: chapter 2). 
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It is very hard to test statistically the effects of income and wealth inequality on the national 
tax. There are many obstacles to the creation of the kind of panel data set that would be 
needed, including the challenges of estimating the division of the tax burden among income or 
wealth groups. It is again in relation to Latin America that we are most likely to see progress. 
The fiscal data is more reliable and standardised than for most of Africa and low income Asia, 
and currently considerable efforts are going into improving the data, estimating the incidence 
of the tax burden among income groups, and generally trying better to understand the politics 
of taxation.47 
 
Subject to any conclusions that emerge from further research in Latin America or elsewhere, 
it seems sensible to assume that, for the kinds of reasons given above, income and wealth 
inequality are more likely to be associated with low than with high tax takes. 
 
4.2 Fiscal contracting 
 
Progressive Latin American intellectuals, especially those associated with the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago, have long been attracted to 
notions of social and fiscal contracts or pacts. Leaving aside the explicit fiscal pact that the 
political parties and a number of interest groups signed in Chile in 1990 just before the 
restoration of democracy after Pinochet’s military rule (Boylan 1996), the discourses around 
fiscal/social contracts are in most cases best understood as pleas to the Latin American rich 
that they should pay more taxes in order that governments can engage in more social 
spending and thus strengthen ‘social solidarity’. Thus used, the concept has considerable 
normative appeal but little analytic substance. However, a few years ago Jeffrey Timmons 
(2005) presented an analytic notion of the fiscal contract, and his work has recently been 
extended, for Latin America, by Bird and Zolt (2013). 
 
The core assumptions behind Timmons’ approach are that: 
 
 Governments can be considered as quasi-monopolistic providers of public services. 
 From the perspective of their institutional self-interests (in staying in power, 
expanding authority, etc.), governments are likely to seek and seize opportunities to 
expand their revenue collections and their spending responsibilities provided that they 
can broker deals that will command support among potentially competing socio-
economic interest groups (notably various types of taxpayers and various potential 
beneficiaries of public spending) by acting as ‘discriminating monopolists’. 
 
Timmons’ main proposition is that governments will seek to achieve the overall fiscal contract 
– the agreement to tax and spend more – by making different deals with different interest 
groups. Specifically, by looking at patterns of taxation and public spending across a large 
sample of countries, Timmons tests the proposition that governments will exchange revenues 
for policies not with taxpayers en masse, but with specific groups of them. It is groups of 
taxpayers, not the whole category, that provide revenue for the state, through distinct 
channels, for the services that they specifically need. In sum, using two data series, Timmons 
finds first that governments that spend high proportions of GDP on social services like health 
and education tend to depend relatively heavily for their incomes on regressive consumption 
taxes – notably sales and excise taxes, and VAT – that fall relatively heavily on the main 
beneficiaries of this kind of spending, i.e. the poor. Because government is providing services 
for the poor, it is also able to tax them. Simultaneously, those governments that spend a high 
proportion of GDP on protecting property rights – i.e. on the services especially valued by 
wealthy people – also depend relatively heavily on taxes that bear most heavily on the rich: 
                                                 
47  Among the many sources, see Arnson et al. (2012); Bird and Zolt (2013); Corbacho et al. (2013); and Lopez-Calva and 
Lustig (2010). 
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taxes on income and wealth. Some governments focus their taxing and spending more on the 
poor, some on the rich, and some on both.  
 
The conclusions of any single set of econometric estimates are always vulnerable to 
modification or refutation as a result of re-estimations using more data, better data, or 
improved estimation methods. We cannot yet assume that fiscal contracting, as Timmons 
defines it, actually takes place on any scale. However, his framework provides an analytical 
advance – with potential policy relevance over the standard near-truism that taxpayers are 
more willing to pay taxes if they feel they are getting something in return. Bird and Zolt (2013) 
have used the fiscal contracting notion recently in the effort to make sense of exciting recent 
fiscal and socio-economic developments in much of Latin America, including: (a) reduced 
levels of income inequality; (b) the steady growth of tax takes; and (c) the inception of 
substantial programmes for social transfers to poor people, including through conditional cash 
transfer schemes. Bird and Zolt hypothesise that a period of sustained economic growth, 
leading to the expansion of what is often termed the new middle class, is changing the Latin 
American fiscal politics I summarised earlier, notably the lack of interest of actual/potential 
income tax payers in financing public service expansion. They suggest that the new middle 
class are both in a position to pay personal income taxes and interested in using expanded 
public services, including health and education. Bird and Zolt suggest that this could be the 
beginning of a substantial change in the fiscal politics of Latin America: a new fiscal 
contracting process in which large non-poor populations are increasingly willing to pay taxes, 
including direct income taxes, in return for expanded, relatively universal public services.48 If 
that is correct, then parts of Latin America may be on a convergence path with the classic 
European welfare states: relatively high levels of publicly-funded, universal social protection 
funded by taxes that impinge substantially on median earners as well as the rich.  
 
The analysis by Bird and Zolt implies a specific hypothesis: fiscal contracting – the exchange 
of revenue contributions from specific, differentiated taxpayer groups for preferred spending 
patterns on the part of government – is more likely if income is more equally distributed. But 
more important perhaps is the approach itself. The analytics of the fiscal contracting 
framework have not yet been explored or tested in detail. It does however seem to provide a 
way of developing nuanced and testable hypotheses about the causal connections between 
levels of revenue collection and the fiscal politics of interest groups.  
 
 
5  The configuration of governing institutions 
 
It is more than two decades since Steinmo (1989) produced one of the classic illustrations of 
how variations in institutions visibly shape public policy: an explanation of how the 
configuration of governance institutions helped explain why the tax take – and the general 
level of political support for taxation – was lower in the United States than in most countries 
of  Western Europe. It is essentially a matter of the extent of fusion within a single institution 
of the power to raise revenues and the power to decide on the allocation of public spending. 
Assume that decisions to raise revenue are always to some degree unpopular. Politicians will 
tend to avoid them if they can. However, in European parliamentary democracies, both 
taxing and spending decisions are made by the political executive, controlled by a single 
political party or by a party coalition. When fiscal decisions are fused in this way, the 
unpopularity that arises from increasing taxes can be (more or less) offset by the popularity 
that can arise from the resultant increased public spending. By contrast, in the government of 
the United States, fiscal initiatives and decisions are located to a much higher degree in 
                                                 
48  They also suggest that the United States might be undergoing the reverse process: the decreasing willingness of the 
people who pay most federal tax – relatively wealthy payers of personal income tax – to finance public services from 
which they receive little direct benefit.   
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committees within the legislature (Houses of Representatives and Senate). The membership 
of revenue-raising and spending committees differs. The members of revenue-raising 
committees suffer unpopularity when they raise taxes, but do not benefit from any of the 
popularity that might be generated by increased spending. They are motivated to be 
especially resistant to increasing taxes. There is, Steinmo argued, an inbuilt bias against 
revenue raising in American political institutions, at least when compared to Western Europe. 
 
These ideas about the impact of political institutions on tax levels can be tested only through 
comparisons. Testing general propositions requires reliable fiscal information for a substantial 
period of time on a relatively large sample of countries (or other political jurisdictions) that are 
similar in many respects but exhibit variation in the political institutions that are believed to 
affect fiscal outcomes. Within the low income regions of the world, only Latin America meets 
these conditions. It has a diverse mixture of presidential systems, in which powers over fiscal 
issues tend to be relatively dispersed, and parliamentary systems, in which fiscal authority is 
more concentrated. But there are variations within each system. Researchers have ranked 
Latin American polities according to the power of the political executive relative to the 
legislature in respect of fiscal decisions. They have then reached conclusions analogous to 
Steinmo’s: when power is more concentrated within the political executive, the tax take tends 
to be higher (Corbacho et al. 2013: 27-29).  
 
Other variations in governance institutions also seem to affect the tax take. If electoral 
systems over-represent rural populations, who typically provide less revenue per head than 
urban populations (Section 1), then the tax take seems to drop fractionally (Ardanaz and 
Scartascini 2011). The quality and temporal coverage of fiscal data in low income countries 
is however sufficiently low that we need to be: (a) wary of statistical findings that are not 
replicated with differing data sets, alternative definitions of key concepts and varying 
statistical models; and (b) pessimistic about the likelihood that cross-national statistical 
analysis will within the next few years throw much new light on the political variables that 
affect tax takes.  
 
 
6  The difficulties of taxing transnational 
transactions 
 
There is now a wide international consensus, expressed in particular in the decisions of the 
2013 meetings of the G8 and the G20, that the current system of taxing international 
economic transactions is in need of substantial reform. There are a variety of interpretations 
of the problems and the potential solutions, but little doubt that the core problem lies in the 
tension between: 
 
 The fact that taxation is still dominantly the responsibility of national governments, 
who compete actively with one another – through in various ways reducing effective 
tax rates – to obtain larger shares of taxable activities, including by encouraging the 
formal relocation of ‘taxable activities’ through accounting and legal fictions of various 
kinds. 
 The steady growth over recent decades in the relative importance of transnational 
economic activities, with a resultant increase in the incentives and scope to engage in 
these accounting and legal fictions. 
 
The main problem to date is not so much that corporations as a whole have avoided taxes. 
The contributions of corporate taxes to government revenue have on the whole held up. It is 
rather that the current system is: 
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 Economically inefficient, because (a) actual tax burdens are allocated with a high 
degree of arbitrariness, and with a general bias against economic transactions and 
companies that are not transnational, and (b) considerable resources are consumed 
in gaming the system. 
 Potentially politically unsustainable, especially in those OECD countries facing major 
fiscal constraints and reductions in public spending.  
 Unnecessarily complicated because transnational corporations, that integrate their 
activities globally – in terms of the location of activities, value chains, financial and 
management systems, research and development, etc. – are still taxed as if they in 
reality comprised simply a large number of independent companies incorporated (i.e. 
legally domiciled) in a variety of jurisdictions.49 
 Least effective in producing reasonable and sustainable outcomes in respect of the 
fastest-growing categories of international economic transactions: ‘intangibles’ 
(products of service industries) rather than ‘tangibles’ (products of manufacturing, 
agricultural or extractive industries); and, within the intangibles category, various 
kinds of e-commerce activities.  
 
It is difficult to say whether the problems of the current system are worse in: 
 
 High income countries, where transnational corporations focus their activities and 
where there is much greater scope for tax avoidance and evasion because of the 
higher proportion of transnational economic transactions that involve ‘intangibles’ 
(services like management, design, intellectual property rights) and e-commerce. 
 Low income countries – and especially smaller low income countries – where tax 
administrations tend to be relatively weak and under-equipped, and find it difficult to 
challenge effectively the accounts presented to them by larger transnational 
companies (Introduction). 
 
The biggest single cause of low tax takes in many low income countries is low taxation of the 
extractive industries to which they are often hosts. This is especially true of mining activities, 
which are more likely than oil and gas extraction to be entirely in the hands of overseas 
private transnational companies, and are generally much more severely under-taxed than oil 
and gas (IMF 2012). To some degree, reforms to improve the taxation of extractives, 
especially mining, can be undertaken separately from the more general reforms to improve 
the international tax system that have been suggested by G8 and G20. These are however 
complex issues, for which the appropriate solutions are probably different for different low 
income countries (Lundstøl et al. 2012).  
 
The most widespread form of revenue loss for developing countries from transnational 
economic transactions is almost certainly transfer mispricing: accounting for the value of 
imports or exports in ways that make possible the concentration of company profits in low tax 
jurisdictions or tax havens. Transfer mispricing dominantly takes place between the affiliates 
and subsidiaries of large transnational corporations. It is clear that it is practised on a 
substantial scale,50 although all estimates of the global volumes are contestable. It is however 
only very recently that serious analytical and political attention has been paid to the issue. Tax 
authorities worldwide are tending now to take a tougher attitude to transfer mispricing, and are 
trying, with some success, to curb the worst abuses (Ernst and Young 2013). The optimists 
argue that more sustained attention to the issue might lead to significant additional revenues, 
even for poor countries with relatively weak tax administrations. Pessimists believe that 
                                                 
49  There is a strong logical appeal of the notion of taxing transnational corporations as a single global entity, through what 
is termed unitary taxation or formulary apportionment - <http://www.ictd.ac/en/world-upside-down-new-approach-
international-tax>. However, this proposal faces many practical problems. 
50  Fuest and Riedel (2012); Leite (2012); Nitsch (2012); OECD (2013a). 
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transnational corporations, equipped with hordes of very highly paid specialist accountants 
and lawyers, will find a way to circumvent every check.   
 
We can be sure that the under-taxation of transnational economic transactions is a significant 
cause of low tax takes in low income countries. It is far less clear what should be the 
priorities as far as low income countries are concerned, and how far the current international 
tax reform agenda – that includes measures to improve the flow of information among 
national tax authorities – will address the immediate needs of low income countries.   
 
 
7  Insufficient use of advanced tax 
administration practices51 
 
In the latter decades of the last century, a strong consensus emerged among taxation 
professionals globally that the formal distinction between ‘tax policy’ and ‘tax administration’ 
was of limited policy relevance, because the two domains are in practice highly 
interdependent. Poor administration can easily undermine well-designed tax policies. The 
essence of good tax policy is that it can easily be administered. This consensus is typically 
expressed in the aphorism ‘tax administration is tax policy’. This refers in particular to the 
extent to which complex tax codes and schedules and complex procedures provide wide 
scope for avoidance and evasion.  
 
The emphasis in tax reform shifted to improvements in tax administration. There has emerged 
a package of tax administration reforms that have spread widely. Although these innovations 
have been developed mainly in high income OECD countries, they are broadly appropriate to 
low income countries – not least because they are in large part driven by the adoption of 
mainstream, low-cost information and communication technologies. Elements of these 
reforms have been adopted in virtually all low income countries, sometimes more in rhetoric 
than in reality. Few specialists have taken the view that they are fundamentally inappropriate 
to low income countries. 
 
Commentators list and classify these advanced tax administration practices differently. For 
present purposes, it is useful to group them into three overlapping clusters: 
 
7.1 Organisation by taxpayer segment and function, not tax type 
 
The main historical principle for the structuring of tax agencies was tax type. Offices and 
individuals would be assigned to collect only one of, for example, customs duties and excise, 
sales or income taxes. While appropriate to very low income economies with limited 
commercialisation, this practice results in competition among different tax offices to obtain 
money from the same taxpayers, failure to share information about taxpayers, and high 
transaction costs for taxpayers who have to deal with two or more tax offices. It also reduces 
the chances that tax policy will be regularly appraised from a strategic perspective.  
 
Structuring tax collection by tax type is now giving way to two alternative organisational 
principles. The first is what is known in the trade as taxpayer segment, i.e. type of taxpayer. 
The application of the principle has mainly involved the concentration of a scarce resource – 
the most competent and committed accountants and auditors – on the complex affairs of the 
                                                 
51  This section derives immediately from Moore (2013). A wide range of sources are cited there. Some of the more current 
and useful are Bergman (2003); Bird (2004); Bird and Zolt (2008); Cantens et al. (2013); Cantens et al. (2010); Crandall 
(2010); Ebrill et.al. (2001); Fossat and Bua (2013); Kidd (2010); Kloeden (2011); OECD (2009); Vázquez-Caro and Bird 
(2010); Zake (2011).  
  29 
small number of large companies that typically provide a high proportion of tax revenue for 
governments of low income countries.52 This in turn permits the deployment of staff with weak 
accounting skills on more routine tasks.53 The revenue agencies of most OECD countries now 
have a separate unit for large taxpayers (OECD 2009: 50). Similar units have been 
established in more than half the countries of Anglophone Africa, although their effectiveness 
is quite variable (Kloeden 2011: 27-29).  
 
The second organisational principle that is becoming more widespread is function, with 
distinct units for activities like taxpayer registration, processing tax returns, processing 
payments, debt collection, auditing and investigations, finance, personnel, legal affairs and 
dispute resolution, investigations and internal compliance (anti-corruption). The main benefits 
of organising by function are those of specialisation (Kidd 2010: 6-7).  
 
As of 2011, only in two small Anglophone African countries (Seychelles and Swaziland) was 
revenue collection still organised principally by tax type; and only in these and two other 
cases (Botswana and Zimbabwe) was there no attempt to organise according to taxpayer 
segments (Kloeden 2011: 24-25). The tax administrations of Francophone Africa have 
undergone less reform, in this and in other respects (Fossat and Bua 2013). 
 
7.2 Establishing and verifying trust 
 
Advanced tax administration reforms combine an increasing trust in the taxpayer with a 
series of measures that collectively increase the capacity of the tax agency to assure itself – 
at relatively low cost – that this trust is not being abused. The most visible manifestation of 
this trust is, especially in respect of corporate and private income and profits taxes and VAT, 
a growing reliance on self-assessment by the taxpayer.54 Tax administrations are 
increasingly able to cross-check the reliability of the information provided by taxpayers using 
two instruments that rely on the spread of ICTs: the allocation of unique tax identification 
numbers to each taxpaying unit; and data on assets, incomes or expenditures derived from 
‘third party’ sources (banks, electricity providers, motor vehicle sales, property sales, credit 
card accounts, and company ownership and dividend payments). These instruments are not 
yet widely used in most low income countries. The same is true of the more significant 
change in tax practice to which they contribute: the shift to risk-based audit. Audit units 
traditionally have often been used to squeeze taxpayers suspected of having the capacity to 
pay more or as last minute means of helping the tax agency meets its revenue collection 
targets. Risk-based auditing involves targeting auditing resources on those taxpaying units 
that are identified, on the basis of statistical risk analysis that takes into account such factors 
as business type and individuals’ records, as being especially likely to attempt significant 
levels of tax evasion. The immediate objective of risk-based auditing is not revenue collection 
per se, but preserving the integrity of the revenue system by deterring the most egregious tax 
evasion.  
 
7.3 Making tax paying easy and impersonal 
 
The third cluster of advanced tax administration reforms comprises a set of measures to 
make tax paying, including self-assessment, easier for taxpayers and to reduce the extent of 
                                                 
52  Kloeden provides some figures on the VAT taxpayer populations of eight Anglophone African countries for various 
single years between 2004 and 2009. On average, large taxpayers accounted for 4.8 per cent of the VAT taxpayer 
population and for 69 per cent of total VAT receipts (Kloeden 2011: 26). 
53  For example, in Rwanda, regular campaigns to register and collect fees from what are in effect business licences from 
the numerous drivers of motorcycle taxis. 
54  In the case of Customs collection, the equivalent of self-assessment is ‘preferred trader’ arrangements. Importers and 
exporters who enjoy this status on the basis of a clean record use the electronic transfer of their documentation to give 
Customs authorities prior notice of specific shipments, to obtain advanced clearance and thus to obviate the delays – 
and threat of delays – embedded in the traditional system of physical verification of every cross-border consignment. 
Electronic tagging and sensing of goods will reinforce this trend.  
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direct personal interaction relationships between them and tax collectors. The list includes: 
the simplification of tax systems and rates (fewer taxes, fewer rates for each tax, fewer 
exemptions); relocating tax offices or changing procedures to make it easier for taxpayers to 
register, file and pay – including using banks as collection agents; shifting these processes 
online; separating tax assessment and tax collection activities, both physically and 
functionally; providing quicker and fairer means of resolving disputes between tax collector 
and taxpayer; and providing more information to taxpayers about the procedures they are 
required to follow or how government spends their money. Many tax agencies in low income 
countries claim to be adopting or extending these kinds of practices (International Tax 
Dialogue 2010). We have little hard information on the extent of progress. As I explain in 
Section 2, there is no progress to report in respect of one of the items listed above: reducing 
the frequency of tax exemptions.   
 
There is no expert consensus on the relative value of each of these many advanced tax 
administration practices, or on the extent to which they are synergistic with one another. It 
would be misleading to try to rank national tax authorities according to the extent to which 
they have adopted components of the package. These components are tools that can be 
used well or badly. The important conclusion is that there is available a menu of relatively 
well-tested tax administration reform options that are broadly appropriate to the 
circumstances of revenue raising in low income countries. 
 
 
8  The property tax issue55 
 
Property taxes may be levied on the ownership or occupation of land and of residential, 
commercial or industrial buildings. There is a broad consensus over property tax issues 
among tax specialists:56 
 
 Property taxes are generally desirable because, compared to almost all alternative 
revenue sources they (a) do not significantly distort investment decisions, and (b) 
tend genuinely to fall on those better able to pay. 
 They are consistently underused almost throughout the world, and have been 
declining in relative importance even in those countries where they were historically 
relatively important. 
 Property taxes are particularly under-used in most low income countries. 
 
We also have a good general understanding of why property taxes are especially under-used 
in low income countries. Three of the reasons are common to rich and poor countries: 
 
 Because they tend to fall most on those best able to pay, property taxes are 
unpopular with the more politically active and influential social groups. 
 Because property taxes are almost universally collected by and dedicated to financing 
local political jurisdictions (village, urban and city councils, district councils, etc.) they 
are very vulnerable to local elite dominance: rich and influential people are especially 
well placed to oppose them in the local political arenas in which they have a great 
deal of influence. 
 Property taxes are very vulnerable to political and organisational inertia: the failure to 
organise periodic re-valuations to take account of increasing property values and to 
                                                 
55  There are a range of different types of property taxes, including in particular: (a) those that are levied on the ownership 
or occupation of a property; (b) those levied on changes in the legal ownership of a property; and (c) charges for the 
increased property values that result from public investment in infrastructure in the neighbourhood (‘betterment levy’).  
56  The literature on property taxes in low income countries is massive. Anyone wishing to learn more about the issues 
could most usefully begin with Bahl et al. (2008) and Bird (2010, 2011). 
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actually schedule the introduction of the tax in newly-developed urban areas. This 
inertia works in favour of their opponents. In many low income countries, property 
taxes are absurdly low. They may raise little revenue, but serve largely a rent-taking 
purpose: paying the salaries of the people who maintain the property registers and 
collect the taxes.57  
 
Further, there are two specific reasons why property taxes are especially under-used in low 
income countries: 
 
 Generally – although with a few conspicuous exceptions like Brazil – the polities of 
low income countries are strongly centralised in historical and comparative 
perspective. Sub-national governments have little authority and account for an 
unusually low proportion of public spending. In that situation, higher level 
governments may have little interest in supporting the development of revenue 
sources for local governments, and may indeed be actively opposed. Property taxes 
are the dominant single source of own revenue for local governments worldwide.58 
 Improved ways of taxing property do not appear among the list of advanced tax 
administration practices discussed in Section 7 above. Because they are local taxes 
even in OECD countries, and politically increasingly unpopular, they have not 
received the attention of the authoritative organisations – the national tax and aid 
agencies in OECD countries,59 and international organisations like the IMF and the 
OECD – that have been influential in shaping the tax reform agenda in low income 
countries. Nearly all the energies that have gone into tax reform in low income 
countries have been directed at their national tax agencies (Fjeldstad and Moore 
2008; Moore 2013). 
 
From the organisational and logistical perspective, there would seem to be good prospects for 
increasing the tax take in low income countries by establishing more effective property tax 
systems, especially by taxing residential and commercial premises in towns and cities. The 
technology has moved in favour. Geographic information systems, that are anyway 
increasingly becoming valuable tools for many aspects of urban planning, potentially can 
greatly reduce the costs of establishing, maintaining and updating property registers. As in 
other areas of the tax business, the digitalisation of property tax accounts, billing and 
collection can in principle offer great efficiencies. Experiments in locations where property 
records are in a very poor condition suggest that ‘presumptive’ property taxes – that are only 
calibrated to a few gross indicators of property valuations such as the surface area of a 
property – can be both acceptable and efficient ways of getting a property tax system up and 
running (Jibao and Prichard 2012).60 There may be substantial broader governance benefits 
to providing sub-national governments with an independent and relatively buoyant revenue 
source.  
 
Some of the obstacles to wider use of property tax seem straightforwardly political: the 
resistance of property owners and some higher levels of government; and the rent-taking 
currently practised by the people with the power to assess properties, schedule areas for the 
introduction of property tax, and collect the money. They typically put up effective resistance 
to attempts to introduce the digital technologies that would make it possible to cut out some 
                                                 
57  In some low income countries, property taxpayers find this tolerable because evidence of having paid the property tax 
may constitute useful evidence of property ownership or tenancy, or even of personal identity.   
58  Their other main sources tend to be: (a) transfers from higher levels of government; and (b) a range of user charges and 
rentals – for water supply, use of public markets, shop rentals, etc. 
59  The German aid agency, GIZ, is an exception.  
60  In some countries where the real value of property taxes is very low, individual properties are still valued – and 
periodically re-valued – through complex, labour intensive formulae that take into account such factors as: total floor 
area; general condition of the building; location in relation to main roads or commercial areas; number and condition of 
trees within the property; whether the property is rented; whether it is used for commercial purposes; or whether the 
occupier falls into a needy category (e.g. widows).   
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of the rent-taking. There is also a more nuanced institutional obstacle to more effective use 
of property taxes. Innovations in national and international taxation are crafted, tested and 
disseminated within a global ‘epistemic community’ of practising tax experts. These are the 
accountants, economists, lawyers, and tax administrators who work in the IMF, the OECD, 
consultancy companies, transnational auditing and professional services firms (e.g. the Big 
4), associations of tax professionals, national tax administrations and ministries of finance. 
But this global epistemic community intersects barely at all with the more humble, local, 
diverse and numerous worlds of property tax specialists. These property tax worlds are 
populated by collectors, clerks and surveyors, rather than accountants, economists and 
lawyers. They speak many local languages rather than English, French or Spanish. Their 
successes are rarely celebrated, analysed or disseminated. They have few opportunities to 
interact – and therefore to learn – from one another. 
 
 
9  Conclusions 
 
What are the obstacles to increasing tax revenues in low income countries? This paper tries 
to answer that question by examining the literature on the topic and making informed 
judgements about the significance of various propositions. In summary, the conclusions are 
that tax takes are low in low income countries because: 
 
 The structure of their economies makes revenue raising difficult (Section 1). 
 Tax systems are used by a range of influential stakeholders for purposes other than 
official revenue raising, notably rent-taking (Section 2) and as a direct instrument of 
rule (Section 3). 
 Patterns of political competition over fiscal issues between socio-economic interest 
groups may in different circumstances contribute to both lowering and raising the tax 
take (Section 4). 
 The configuration of governing institutions may affect the ways in which fiscal 
decisions are made, and thus the tax take (Section 5). 
 It is organisationally and politically difficult for the tax administrations of (smaller) low 
income countries effectively to tax the transnational economic transactions that 
comprise a steadily growing proportion of their potential revenue base (Section 6). 
 Low income countries do not fully exploit the wide range of ‘advanced’ tax 
administration practices available to them (Section 7). 
 For a mixture of reasons, property taxes are underused in low income countries even 
more than in other countries (Section 8). 
 
These conclusions are only tentative. We are a long way from a confident, comprehensive 
understanding of the obstacles to increasing tax revenues in low income countries. Thorough 
and context-sensitive analysis of a great deal of data relating to a large number of low income 
countries over an extended time period could bring us closer to that understanding. Most of 
this data would have to be quantitative. The figures we have are inadequate in every 
dimension: too few, too aggregated, lacking historical depth, and insufficiently reliable. 
  33 
References 
 
Amin, M. and Hoppe, M. (2013) Where Informal Procedures are Quasi-Formal – Cross-
Border Trade between West and Central Africa, Africa Trade Policy Notes No. 37, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Ardanaz, M. and Scartascini, C. (2011) Why Don't We Tax the Rich? Inequality, Legislative 
Malapportionment, and Personal Income Taxation around the World, Working Paper 
Series No. 282, Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank 
 
Arnson, C.J., Bergman, M. and Fairfield, T. (2012) Taxation and Inequality in Latin America, 
Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars 
 
Bahl, R., Martinez-Vasquez, J. and Youngman, J. (eds) (2008) Making the Property Tax 
Work. Experiences in Developing and Transitional Countries, Cambridge MA: Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy  
 
Bates, R. (1977) Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural 
Policies, Berkeley: University of California Press  
  
Baunsgaard, T. and Keen, M. (2005) Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization, Working 
Paper WP/05/112, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
Bergman, M.S. (2003) ‘Tax Reforms and Tax Compliance: The Divergent Paths of Chile and 
Argentina’, Journal of Latin American Studies 35.3: 593-624 
 
Best, M.H. (1976) ‘Political Power and Tax Revenues in Central America’, Journal of 
Development Economics 3.1: 49-82 
 
Bezemer, D. and Headey, D. (2008) ‘Agriculture, Development, and Urban Bias’, World 
Development 36.8: 1342-1364 
 
Bilangna, S., and Djeuwo, M. (2013) ‘The Figures Culture in Cameroon Customs’, in T. 
Cantens, R. Ireland and G. Raballand (eds), Reform by Numbers. Measurement 
Applied to Customs and Tax Administrations in Developing Countries, Washington 
DC: World Bank 
 
Bird, R.M. (2012) Taxation and Development: What Have We Learned from Fifty Years of 
Research?, ICTD Working Paper No 1, Brighton: International Centre for Tax and 
Development 
 
—— (2011) ‘Subnational Taxation in Developing Countries. A Review of the Literature’, 
Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy, 2.1: 139-161 
 
—— (2010) Subnational Taxation in Developing Countries. A Review of the Literature, Policy 
Research Working Paper, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
—— (2004) ‘Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform’, Asia and Pacific Tax Bulletin, 10.3: 
134-150 
 
—— and Gendron, P-P. (2007) The VAT in Developing and Transitional Countries, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
  34 
—— and Zolt, E.M. (2013) Taxation and Inequality in the Americas: Changing the Fiscal 
Contract?, Working Paper 13-15, Atlanta: Georgia State University, Andrew Young 
School of Policy Studies, International Centre for Public Policy 
 
—— —— (2008) ‘Technology and Taxation in Developing Countries: From Hand to Mouse’, 
National Tax Journal, 61.4: 791-821 
 
Boylan, D.M. (1996) ‘Taxation and Transition. The Politics of the 1990 Chilean Tax Reform’, 
Latin American Research Review, 31.1: 7-31 
 
Cantens, T. (2012) Other People's Money and Goods: The Relationship between Customs 
Officers and Users in Some Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, World Customs 
Organisation, mimeo 
 
—— Ireland, R. and Raballand, G. (eds) (2013) Reform by Numbers. Measurement Applied 
to Customs and Tax Administrations in Developing Countries, Washington DC: World 
Bank 
 
—— Raballand, G. and Bilanga, S. (2010) ‘Reforming Customs by Measuring Performance: 
A Cameroon Case Study’, World Customs Journal, 4.2: 55-73 
 
Chaudhry, K.A. (1997) The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East, 
Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press 
 
Choi, E.K. (2009) ‘The Politics of Fee Extraction from Private Enterprises, 1996-2003’, China 
Journal, 62: 79-102 
 
Christian Aid (2010) Transfer Pricing and the Taxing Rights of Developing Countries, London 
 
Cleeve, E. (2008) ‘How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives to Attract FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa?’, 
Journal of Developing Areas, 42.1: 135-153 
 
Corbacho, A., Cibils, V.F. and Lora, E. (eds) (2013) More than Revenue. Taxation as a 
Development Tool, Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank 
 
Crandall, W. (2010) Revenue Administration: Autonomy in Tax Administration and the 
Revenue Authority Model, Technical Notes and Manuals, 10/12, Washington DC: 
Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund 
 
Cummings, R.G., Martinez-Vazquez, J., McKee, M. and Torgler, B. (2005) Effects of Tax 
Morale on Tax Compliance: Experimental and Survey Evidence, Working Paper 05-
16, Atlanta: Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 
 
Cuvelier, J., and Mumbunda, P.M. (2013) ‘Réforme Douanière Néolibérale, Fragilité Etatique 
et Pluralisme Normatif. Le Cas du Guichet Unique à Kasumbalesa’, Politique 
Africaine, 129: 93-112 
 
Cyan, M, Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Vulovic, V. (2013) Measuring Tax Effort: Does the 
Estimation Approach Matter and Should Effort be Linked to Expenditure Goals?, 
Working Paper 13-08, Atlanta: Georgia State University, Andrew Young School, 
International Center for Public Policy 
 
Daunton, M. (2001) Trusting Leviathan. The Politics of Taxation in Britain 1799-1914, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
  35 
 
Dincecco, M. (2011) Political Transformations and Public Finances: Europe, 1650-1913, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Durand, F. (2002) State Institutional Development: Assessing the Success of the Peruvian 
Tax Reform, San Antonio: University of Texas, 
 
Ebrill, L., Keen, M., Bodin, J-P. and Summers, V. (2002) ‘The Allure of the Value-Added Tax’, 
Finance and Development, 39.2 
 
—— —— —— —— (2001) The Modern VAT, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
Englebert, P. (2009) Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow, Boulder, Col. and London: 
Lynne Rienner 
 
European Commission (2011) Transfer Pricing and Developing Countries. Final Report. 
Brussels: EuropeAid - Implementing the Tax and Development Policy Agenda, 
Brussels: European Commision 
 
Fjeldstad, O-H. (2007) ‘Corruption in Tax Administration. Lessons from Institutional Reforms 
in Uganda’, in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed) International Handbook on the Economics of 
Corruption, London: Edward Elgar 
 
—— and Moore, M. (2009) ‘Revenue Authorities and Public Authority in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 47.1: 1-18 
 
—— —— (2008) ‘Tax Reform and State Building in a Globalized World’, in D. Braütigam, O-
H. Fjeldstad and M. Moore (eds), Taxation and State-Building in Developing 
Countries: Capacity and Consent, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
—— and Therkildsen, O. (2008) ‘Mass Taxation and State-Society Relations in East Africa’, 
in D. Braütigam, O-H. Fjeldstad and M. Moore (eds),Taxation and State-Building in 
Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
 
Fossat, P. and Bua, M. (2013) Tax Administration Reform in the Francophone Countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Working Paper WP/13/173, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund 
 
Fuest, C. and Riedel, N. (2012) ‘Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance: The Role of International 
Profit Shifting’, in P. Reuter (ed), Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit 
Funds from Developing Countries, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Gauthier, B. and Reinikka, R. (2006) ‘Shifting Tax Burdens through Exemptions and Evasion: 
an Empirical Investigation of Uganda’, Journal of African Economies, 15.3: 373-398 
 
Gehlbach, S. (2008) Representation Through Taxation. Representation, Politics and 
Development in Postcommunist States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Gemmell, N and Morrissey, O. (2005) ‘Distribution and Poverty Impacts of Tax Structure 
Reform in Developing Countries: How Little We Know’, Development Policy Review, 
23.2: 131-44 
 
  36 
Gervasoni, C. (2010) ‘A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes. Fiscal Federalism, 
Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces’, World Politics, 62.2: 
302-340 
 
Gupta, A.S. (2007) Determinants of Tax Revenue Efforts in Developing Countries, Working 
Paper WP/07/184, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
Hart, A. (2010) ‘Death of the Partisan? Globalization and Taxation in South America, 1990—
2006, Comparative Political Studies, 43.3: 304-328 
 
Imam, P.A. and Jacobs, D.F. (2007) Effect of Corruption on Tax Revenues in the Middle 
East, Working Paper WP/13/173, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
IMF (2012) Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation, 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
—— (2011) Revenue Mobilisation in Developing Countries, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund 
 
International Tax Dialogue (2010) Revenue Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa, ITD 
Comparative Information Series No 1, Paris: International Tax Dialogue 
 
James, S. (2010) Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications, Washington 
DC: World Bank, Investment Climate Advisory Services 
 
Jerven, M. (2013) Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and 
What to Do About It, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
 
Jibao, S. and Prichard, W. (2012) Rebuilding Local Government Finance After Conflict: The 
Political Economy of Property Tax Reform in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, ICTD 
Working Paper 12, Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development  
 
Joshi, A., Prichard, W. and Heady, C. (2012) Taxing the Informal Economy: Challenges, 
Possibilities and Remaining Questions, ICTD Working Paper No. 4, Brighton: 
International Centre for Tax and Development 
 
Keen, M. (2012) Taxation and Development – Again, Working Paper WP/12/220, 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
—— (2007) VAT Attacks!, Working Paper WP/07/142, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund 
 
—— and Lockwood, B. (2010) ‘The Value Added Tax: Its Causes and Consequences’, 
Journal of Development Economics, 92.2: 138-151 
 
Kidd, M. (2010) Revenue Administration: Functionally Organized Tax Administration, 
Technical Notes and Manuals 10/10, Washington DC: Fiscal Affairs Department, 
International Monetary Fund 
 
Klemm, A. (2009) Causes, Benefits, and Risks of Business Tax Incentives, Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund 
 
—— and Parys, S. (2012) ‘Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Tax Incentives’, International 
Tax and Public Finance, 19.3: 393-423 
  37 
 
Kloeden, D. (2011) Revenue Administration Reforms in Anglophone Africa Since the Early 
1990s, Working Paper WP/11/162, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
Knack, S. (2009) ‘Sovereign Rents and Quality of Tax Policy and Administration’, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 37.3: 359-371 
 
Land, A. (2004) Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: the Rwanda Revenue Authority, 
ECDPM Discussion Paper 57D, Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy 
Management 
 
Leite, C.A. (2012) ‘The Role of Transfer Pricing in Illicit Financial Flows, in P. Reuter (ed), 
Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Levi, M. (1988) Of Rule and Revenue, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press 
 
Li, Q. (2006) ‘Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A 
Cross-National Analysis’, The Journal of Politics, 68.01: 62-74 
 
Lopez-Calva, L.F. and Lustig, N. (2010) Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of 
Progress?, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 
 
Lundstøl, O., Raballand, G. and Nyirongo, F. (2012) Mining Revenues in Zambia and 
Tanzania: Fiscal design, technical capacity or political will?, ICTD Working Paper No. 
9, Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development 
 
Madies, T. and Dethier, J-J. (2010) Fiscal Competition in Developing Countries. A Survey of 
the Theoretical and Empirical Literature, Policy Research Working Paper 5311, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Mann, M. (1993) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-
States, 1760-1914, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
Mkandawire, T. (2010) ‘On Tax Efforts and Colonial Heritage in Africa’, Journal of 
Development Studies, 46.10: 1647-69 
 
Moore, M. (forthcoming) ‘Taxation and Development’, in C. Lancaster and N.V. d. Walle 
(eds), Handbook on the Politics of Development, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press 
 
—— (2013) Revenue Reform and State-Building in Anglophone Africa, ICTD Working Paper 
No. 10, Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development 
  
—— (2008a) ‘Between Coercion and Contract: Competing Narratives on Taxation and 
Governance’, in D. Braütigam, O-H. Fjeldstad and M. Moore (eds), Taxation and 
State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
—— (2008b) How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?, IDS Working Paper 
280, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies 
  
  38 
Nitsch, V. (2012) ‘Trade Mispricing and Illicit Flows’, in P. Reuter (ed), Draining 
Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
 
OECD (2013a) Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
—— (2013b) Analysis of Tax Expenditures in Ghana, Paris: OECD Tax and Development 
Program 
 
—— (2009) Tax Administration in OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries, Paris: OECD 
Forum on Tax Administration 
 
Omoigui Okauru, I.M. (2013) ‘Insights on the Reform of the Nigerian Tax System (2002-
2012)’, in The NLI White Papers Volume 2, Abuja: Nigeria Leadership Initiative 
 
Pessino, C. and Fenochietto, R. (2010) ‘Determining Countries' Tax Effort’, Hacienda Public 
Espanola/Revista de Economia Publica, 194.4: 65-87 
 
Prichard, W. (2009) The Politics of Taxation and Implications for Accountability in Ghana 
1981-2008, IDS Working Paper 330, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies 
 
—— Brun, J-F. and Morrissey, O. (2012) Donors, Aid and Taxation in Developing Countries: 
An Overview, ICTD Working Paper No. 6, Brighton: International Centre for Tax and 
Development 
 
Prud'homme, R. (1992) ‘Informal Local Taxation in Developing Countries’, Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy, 10: 1-17 
 
Rabelland, G. and Rajaram, A. (2013) Behavioural Economics and Public Sector Reform. An 
Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon, Policy Research Working Paper 
6595, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Reuter, P. (ed) (2012) Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from 
Developing Countries, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Seiferling, M. (2013) Recent Improvements to the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
Database in Response to Analytical Needs, Working Paper WP/13/15, Washington 
DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
Steinmo, S. (1989) ‘Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden and 
Britain’, World Politics, 41.4: 500-535 
 
Tax Justice Network-Africa and Action Aid International (2012) Tax Competition in East 
Africa. A Race to the Bottom? Tax Incentives and Revenue Losses in Uganda, 
Nairobi and Johannesburg: Tax Justice Network-Africa and Action Aid International 
 
Therkildsen, O. (2012) Democratisation in Tanzania. No Taxation without Exemptions, paper 
presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, August 29–
September 2, 2012, New Orleans 
 
—— (2004) ‘Autonomous Tax Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of the 
Uganda Revenue Authority’, Forum for Development Studies, 31.1: 59-88 
 
  39 
Tilly, C. (2005) ‘Regimes and Contention’, in T. Janoski (ed), The Handbook of Political 
Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
—— (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992, Cambridge MA and 
Oxford UK: Blackwell 
 
Timmons, J.F. (2005) ‘The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes and Public Services’, World 
Politics, 57.4: 530-567 
 
Titeca, K. (2009) ‘The “Masai” and Miraa: Public Authority, Vigilance and Criminality in a 
Ugandan Border Town’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 47.2: 291-317 
 
—— and Kimanuka, C. (2012) Walking in the Dark. Informal Cross-Border Trade in the 
Great Lakes Region, London: International Alert 
 
Torgler, B. (2005) ‘Tax Morale in Latin America’, Public Choice, 122.1: 133-157 
 
—— (2004) Tax Morale, Trust and Corruption: Empirical Evidence from Transition Countries, 
Working Paper 2004-5, Basel: Center for Research in Economics, Management and 
the Arts 
 
Transparency International (2012) East African Bribery Index 2012, Nairobi: Transparency 
International 
 
UNDESA (2013) Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, New York: 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
 
Vázquez-Caro, J. and Bird, R.M. (2010) ‘Benchmarking Tax Administrations in Developing 
Countries: A Systemic Approach’, E Journal of Tax Research 9.1: 5-37 
 
Yun Casalilla, B. and O'Brien, P.K. (eds) (2012) The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 
1500-1914, New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
Zake, J. (2011) Customs Administration Reform and Modernization in Anglophone Africa—
Early 1990s to Mid-2010, Working Paper WP/11/184, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund 
 
Zee, H.H., Stotsky, J.G. and Ley, E. (2002) ‘Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A 
Primer for Policy Makers in Developing Countries’, World Development, 30.9: 1497-
1516 
 
Zolberg, A.R. (1980) ‘Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and 
England’, International Social Science Journal, 32.4: 687-716 
International Centre for Tax and Development
at the Institute of Development Studies
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
T: +44 (0)1273 606261
F: +44 (0)1273 621202
E:  info@ictd.ac
www.ictd.ac
